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Plenary Power and Animus in Immigration Law
SHALfNI BHARGAVA RAY*
After a campaign denigratingMuslims as "sick people, " blaming the
children of Muslim Americans for terrorism, and promising to "shut
down" Muslim immigration, and mere days after his inauguration,
PresidentDonald J. Trump banned the nationals of seven majorityMuslim countriesfrom entry into the UnitedStates. In the litigationthat
followed, one question persisted: how should courts analyze an
exclusion order when the President invokes a national security
justification, and there is also direct evidence of racial or religious
animus? The United States Supreme Court reviews exclusion decisions
deferentially for the existence of a 'facially legitimate and bona fide
reason,"under Kleindienst v. Mandel, but explicit animus raises a key
question: what effect, if any, does explicitpresidentialanimus have on
this deferentialstandardof review?
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
grantof a preliminary injunction againstthe third version of the travel
ban. The majority deferred to the President's national security
justfication, despite smoking gun evidence of anti-Muslim animus,
because it determined that animus was not the "sole" motive for the
travel ban. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that a reasonable
observer would conclude that the travel ban's "primarypurpose" was
to express hostility toward Muslims, and deference was unwarranted.
At the root of this debate is a disagreementabout the properanalysis of
mixed motives.
Analyzing deference andanalogous doctrines in other areas of law, this
Article arguesfor a thirdway: that courts should use a mixed motives
framework invalidatinga contested law where the same law would not
have been promulgatedbutfor animus. Under this approach,plaintiffs
must "plausibly" allege animus with "sufficient particularity." Upon
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the government must
proffer some evidence of an independently sufficientjustfication,apart
from animus, for the challengedpolicy. Ultimately, the plaintiffs must
prove that animus was a necessary motive for the contested law. This
framework invalidates laws lacking sufficient non-animusjustification
* Visiting Lecturer (to July 1, 2019) and Assistant Professor of Law (effective July 1,
2019), Culverhouse School of Law at the University of Alabama. J.D., Harvard Law School;
A.B., Stanford University. I am grateful to William Araiza, Alfred Brophy, Richard Delgado,
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enriching conversations about this project, I thank Dean Mark Brandon, Stephanie Bornstein,
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Sugata Ray, and Stacey Steinberg. Brenton Smith provided outstanding research assistance.
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but permits laws for which animus is not a necessary motive. This
Article seeks to offer a way for courts to capture better the benefits of
immigrationdeference while minimizing the costs.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 27, 2017, Tareq and Ammar Aziz, brothers from Yemen, flew
into Dulles International Airport outside Washington, D.C. to reunite with their
father, Aquel, a U.S. citizen.I After landing, however, officers told them their
visas were "canceled" and sent them back on the first flight to Ethiopia, where
Ethiopian officials confiscated their identification papers. President Donald J.

I Rachel Weiner & Paul Schemm, These Brothers Were Forced out by Trump's
Executive Order. On Monday, They Moved to the U.S., WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/loca/public-safety/these-brothers-were-forced-out-bytrumps-executive-order-on-monday-they-moved-to-the-us/2017/02/06/Oal5Ofec-e9771 e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d story.html?utm term=.446a349249a2 [https://perna.cc/BLP7ZW3G].
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Trump's first travel ban thwarted their reunion, "a year and a half in the
2
making."
Aquel Aziz first came to the United States as a student in 2001 and
eventually became a permanent resident and then a citizen. 3 He lived in Flint,
Michigan. For years, Aquel sent money to help support his sons, who were
living with their mother, Aquel's ex-wife. The boys lived well, and then the civil
war in Yemen started. Gunfire was commonplace, and then "Saudi-led airstrikes
began," and conditions worsened.4 The boys witnessed the victims of these
attacks, dead or limbless, and knew they had to escape. With no U.S. embassy
in Yemen, obtaining visas required them to travel some distance. They traveled
by car and air to Djibouti-via Qatar-for interviews at the U.S. embassy there.
On January 25, their applications for permanent residency, or "green cards,"
were approved. On January 27, the brothers arrived at Dulles, leaving Yemen's
bloodshed behind them. However, reporters note that Customs and Border
5
Patrol (CBP) officials stopped them, telling them, "Yemenis, this way." CBP
officials detained and '6handcuffed the brothers and then told them that their
"visas were canceled." The brothers asked if they could call their lawyer, but
7
the officials said no, "[I]t's a presidential order. You can't do anything."
Officials then instructed the brothers to sign the papers presented to them or be
barred from entering the United States for five years. 8 Not understanding what
they were signing, the brothers signed away their right to permanent residence
and were removed on the next flight to Ethiopia. 9 Unfortunately, in Ethiopia,
officials confiscated the brothers' Yemeni passports, effectively10 erasing any
path of exit, trapping them in a country where they had no status.
The Aziz brothers were just two of thousands of noncitizens whose life
plans were upended by President Trump's travel bans. 11 These bans against
foreign nationals, mostly from majority-Muslim countries, 12 have revived
2

]d.; see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(describing "immediate and widespread" impact of the ban, including "that thousands of

visas were immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas were prevented from
boarding airplanes bound for the United States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers
were detained").
3 Weiner & Schemm, supra note 1.

41Id.
5
1d
6

1d

7

Id

8

1d

9 Weiner & Schemm, supra note 1.
10 1d.
11

See Amrit Cheng, The Muslim Ban: What Just Happened?, ACLU (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/muslim-ban-what-just-happened
[https://perma.cc/CDW7-RGQY] (describing impact on families).
12 The last of the three travel bans barred nationals from Venezuela and North Korea as
well. See Proclamation No. 9645, Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities
and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other
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dormant questions about whether courts must defer to the political branches
under the "plenary power" doctrine 13 even where the President demonstrates
animus toward a racial or religious group.
Although Congress, and not the President, possesses "plenary power" in
immigration law, 14 Congress has delegated exclusion power to the President
through 8 U.S.C. § I82(f),15 and courts have characterized other discretionary
exclusions as "plenary."'1 6 Moreover, some scholars and judges contend even
today that the President possesses "inherent" power to exclude noncitizens. 1 7
"Plenary" suggests "absolute" power, but most scholars and judges today regard
such a notion as incompatible, or at least in serious tension, with a Constitution
granting the federal government only limited powers.' 8 Most interpret "plenary
power" to mean some form of nonjusticiability, and in immigration law

Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45166, at § 2(d), (f) (Sept. 24, 2017) (describing
reasons
for including North Korea and Venezuela).
13
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599-600
(1889). Critics contend that "plenary power" lacks a textual basis in the Constitution, despite
the attempt to ground it in the Naturalization Clause of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Ilya
Somin, The Constitutional Rights of Noncitizens, LEARN LIBERTY (Apr. 30, 2017),
http://www.learnliberty.org/blog/t-he-constitutional-rights-of-noncitizens
[https://perma.cc/UCV6-KDJE]. Courts have also described it as an "inherent power" of
every sovereign. See United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
(describing the exclusion of noncitizens as "a fundamental act of sovereignty" and arguing
that it stems not from a legislative delegation, but "is inherent in the executive power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation"). Alternatively, Professor David A. Martin
characterizes plenary power as a federalism doctrine, one ensuring the dominance of the
federal government vis-AI-vis the states in immigration law. See David A. Martin, Why
Immigration'sPlenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29,31 (2015).
14
I.N.S v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (describing Congress's power over
noncitizens as plenary) (emphasis added); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 478 (2009).
15
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1995 § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018).
16See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
17
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Knauff); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
318 (1936) (stating that the "powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution"); Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Knauff for the
proposition that the President possesses the inherent power to exclude noncitizens); Martin,
supra note 13, at 36 ("[A]sserting jurisdiction over a territory, which includes authority to
choose which noncitizens to admit or exclude, is simply part of what it means to be a
sovereign
nation.").
18
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757-58 (1893) (Fields, J.,
dissenting) (dismissing notion of an "inherent" power to deport foreigners); GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 120-21 (1996); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship,
Standing, andImmigrationLaw, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373,385 (2004) ("The notion that a federal
power can derive from another source or be inherent in sovereignty is at odds with this
tradition.").
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specifically, it amounts to deference. 19 With respect to exclusion laws, courts
will uphold a decision for any "facially legitimate20 and bona fide" reason, the
standard first articulated in Kleindienst v. Mandel.

Defenders of plenary power deference argue that the doctrine preserves the
President's ability to act quickly and flexibly, enabling him to balance
competing considerations without being second-guessed by courts in areas
where the President often has superior expertise and responsibility. 2 1 Critics
contend, however, that judicial deference in this arena often leaves serious gaps
in constitutional protection for noncitizens and essentially legitimates invidious
discrimination. 22 Expansive discretion may also lead to inefficiency, waste, and
poor policy design because deference preserves a space for laws based on
23
stereotypes, lax presumptions, and other poor reasoning.
Does this laxity between means and ends extend to the President's motives?
In the wake of President Trump's travel bans, the question becomes: how should
courts analyze constitutional challenges to an exclusion order where the
President offers a national security rationale for the order, but plaintiffs also
have direct evidence of the President's racial or religious animus toward the

19

See NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 134 ("The more enduring legacy of the Chinese
Exclusion Case in constitutional doctrine is not the claim that constitutional limits on the
immigration power do not exist, but.., that courts should be wary of enforcing them."), and
138 (describing "the application of 'political question' reasoning---either as a denial of
justiciability or as an extraordinarily deferential standard of review"); Cox, supra note 18, at
382-83.
20
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. Although a point of debate, many judges applied Mandel
to the travel bans. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir. 2017),
vacatedas moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). The Supreme Court applied Mandel as well.
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
21 See Martin, supra note 13, at 42; see also William D. Araiza, Deference to
Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 884 n.20 (2013). See generally Paul Horwitz, Three Faces ofDeference,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1079-90 (2008) (identifying legal and epistemic authority
bases for deference).
22
See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the
ConstitutionalLaw of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1998) (arguing that plenary
power doctrine was born in cases "authorizing racial discrimination-and sympathetic to
that discrimination"); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,Aliens,
Territories,and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over ForeignAffairs, 81
TEx. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) (noting the association of inherent powers decisions with the rise
in "nativist, nationalistic, and authoritarian impulses among the nation's political elites that
justified the subjugation of 'inferior' peoples").
23
See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: JudicialDeference to CongressionalFolly,
in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 345 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (arguing
that mandatory detention of noncitizens pending removal, purportedly justified by
Congress's plenary power, is wasteful and ineffective).
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individuals the order targets? 24 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(t), the President has the
authority to exclude noncitizens whose entry he determines would be
"detrimental" to U.S. interests. 2 5 Courts have reviewed the scope of this
authority under Mandel.2 6 As the lower courts adjudicated the multiple lawsuits,
two competing interpretations of the Mandel standard emerged. The first,
advanced by the government and accepted by a number of federal appellate
judges, would shield the President's exclusion directives from judicial scrutiny
so long as he articulates one "facially legitimate" reason, no matter how
insubstantial, even if he also expresses animus toward the excluded group. 2 7 The
second, articulated by the Fourth Circuit majority in Int'l Refugee Assistance
Projectv. Trump, extends deference only to good faith deliberations. 2 8 On this
view, where plaintiffs "plausibly allege" bad faith, such as animus, with
"sufficient particularity," deference evaporates, and courts may apply strict
scrutiny.2 9 In sum, the lower courts that analyzed the effect of the President's
anti-Muslim statements on the validity of his travel bans have taken one of two
views: full, continued deference, provided the President supplies even one
legitimate reason for the challenged policy 30 or, alternatively, no deference at
all.

31

The Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Hawaii, reversing the Ninth
Circuit's affirmance of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction,
mirrored this debate. 32 The majority adopted the view that the government's
articulation of one legitimate reason, no matter how flimsy, could insulate the

24 Other scholars have posed a version of this question. See Michael Kagan, Is the
Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law? (The PresidentIs Trying to FindOut), 1 NEV. L.J.

F. 80,2 581 (2017).

Immigration & Nationality Act of 1995 § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). Under
the tripartite framework articulated in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, also known as the Steel Seizure Case, the President's power is
at its "maximum" when "the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
by Congress."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952).
26
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir.), vacated

as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.); Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir.
2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

27See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (arguing that a law excluding noncitizens
should
not be invalidated unless animus is the sole purpose of the law) (emphasis added).
28
nt 'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 592 ("And having concluded that the
'facially legitimate' reason proffered by the government is not 'bona fide,' we no longer
defer2to
that reason and instead may 'look behind' EO-2.").
9
See id. at 593 (applying strict scrutiny to plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims).
See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
31 See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591.
30

32 Trump

v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). As noted above, however, the
Supreme Court assumed the "sole" motive standard applied but did not decide the question.
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ban from further scrutiny under Mandel,33 while the dissenters found34deference
unwarranted because of the ban's discriminatory "primary purpose."
This Article, however, rejects both extremes-the former for confusing
deference for abdication, and the second for requiring excessive precision by
the political branches in a realm implicating foreign affairs. 35 Drawing on Equal
Protection, Establishment Clause, and Due Process jurisprudence, this Article
argues that courts should use a mixed motives analysis to review an exclusion
law where plaintiffs have direct evidence of animus. This framework requires
the plaintiff to allege racial or religious animus with particularity and for the
defendant to then come forward with evidence of a legitimate national security
justification, with the plaintiff carrying the ultimate burden of proof that animus
was a "but-for" motive behind the exclusion policy. 36 This approach preserves
substantial deference while holding accountable purveyors of animus and, thus,
takes both deference and animus seriously. As explained below, the "but-for"
mixed motives framework ultimately offers no defense from the implementation
of animus-driven policy where the same policy would have been adopted
37
regardless of animus, but this approach nonetheless has expressive value. It
offers resort to legal process to advance the values3 8 of legitimacy and
accountability while respecting the separation of powers.
Part II provides an overview of the travel ban litigation and illustrates the
two views of plenary power deference that emerged in the litigation-absolute
deference that tolerates any amount of animus and deference that evaporates
upon a showing of any animus. Part I explains the concept of deference
generally and the evolution of plenary power deference specifically. Part IV
examines Equal Protection and Establishment Clause jurisprudence relevant to
racial and religious discrimination and further examines in an analogous setting,
that of vindictive prosecution, how courts analyze discretionary decisions where
33
1d.
34

at 2419-20.
1d. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
35 For the argument that subjecting exclusion law to normal constitutional analysis
"throw[s] ...the baby [out] with the bathwater," see Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and
Sovereignty: JudicialReview ofImmigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 1, 66 (2018).
36

For an explanation of the four principal motive standards in the law, see Andrew

Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1159-60 (2018)

(arguing that nearly all motive standards in the law reduce to just four: sole, but-for, primary,
and any). Although Professor Verstein "avoids" using any causation language, it is useful in
analysis. Id.at 1124.
this Article's
37
See Kagan, supra note 24, at 89 (suggesting that review of animus-driven exclusion
policy might survive scrutiny if animus was not a "but for" cause of the challenged law); cf
Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and AntidiscriminationLaw, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083,

2147 (2017) (arguing for laws protecting people against discrimination on the basis of
marital status and sexual orientation, in part due to the "expressive value in laws proclaiming
kinds of discrimination to be impermissible and unacceptable").
certain
38

But see Jacob T. Levy, The Limits of Legalism, NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-limits-of-legalism/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ8R-HQL3]
(arguing that the only serious check on abuses of plenary power is politics).
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the decisionmaker has exhibited animus. Drawing on insights from this
jurisprudence, this Article proposes a mixed motives framework to analyze
animus-based immigration law. Under this framework, plaintiffs must plead
animus with sufficient particularity, and defendants must come forward with
evidence showing that animus was not necessary to the challenged law. 39
Plaintiffs will not win merely upon a showing that animus "tainted" the
exclusion law or that animus predominated over an independently sufficient
legitimate justification. But the exclusion law also will not survive judicial
scrutiny simply upon defendants' showing that some other motive also played a
role. Part V applies this framework to the Trump travel bans. Finally, it further
considers the most likely objections to this approach. In so doing, this Article
takes both deference and animus seriously and seeks to introduce nuance into a
largely binary discussion of immigration deference.

II. TRAVEL BAN LITIGATION OVERVIEW
The travel ban litigation serves as a valuable setting for analyzing what
effect animus should have on plenary power in immigration. Each of the three
bans raised distinct legal issues, and the numerous lawsuits challenging the bans
featured a variety of statutory and constitutional claims. 4 0 Despite the array of
claims, they all allude to a single question: whether, and under what
circumstances, might direct evidence of animus undermine or even defeat the
President's broad authority in immigration. This Part describes the claimed
statutory basis for the travel bans, the factual background providing direct
evidence of animus, and the court decisions that grappled with whether to defer
to the President under the circumstances, culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision.
Most scholars and jurists characterize the President's authority in
immigration law as delegated by Congress, but some continue to regard it as an
inherent power of the Executive. 4 1 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) states:
39
40

See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1137-39 (describing the "But-For Motive standard").

See Litigation Documents & Resources Related to Trump Executive Order on
Immigration, LAWFARE, https://lawfareblog.comlitigation-documents-resources-relatedtrump-executive-order-immigration [https://perma.cc/59DC-WLGU] [hereinafter Litigation
Documents].
41
See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 461 (describing these two views). Compare
Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 685 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that Congress delegates to the
President his authority in immigration law), and Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that executive discretion in immigration is not "boundless"), with
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc) (characterizing the President's power to exclude noncitizens as
"inherent"). Prior to Kleindienst v. Mandel, several exclusion cases had characterized
Congress's power to exclude as an "inherent" power, but they also tended to refer to the
political branches without distinguishing Congress from the Executive. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
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Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of
aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary,
suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem
42
to be appropriate.
Presidents have historically used this power to suspend entry by groups of
43
noncitizens joined by more than mere nationality. For example, President
Barack Obama suspended entry of noncitizens "who are determined to have
'contributed to the situation in Burundi in specified ways"; President Ronald
44
Reagan excluded those who arrived "from the high seas." Although prior
practice indicates that presidents typically define the suspended class with
greater specificity, § 1182(f) does not, by its own terms, expressly bar
45
nationality-based exclusion.
Courts have generally regarded executive action in immigration as more
susceptible to review than legislative action. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the
Supreme Court reviewed the Attorney General's discretionary denial of a
waiver of inadmissibility to a noncitizen for the existence of a "facially
legitimate and bona fide" reason. 46 In so doing, it distinguished executive
47
discretion from legislative acts more generally. Although Mandel concerned
judicial review of the Attorney General's discretionary decision rather than an
have applied Mandel
executive order articulating criteria for exclusion, courts
48
in other settings, including the travel ban litigation.
Apart from the legal background, the factual setting for the travel bans is
also important. Critics note that President Trump has a long history of
expressing animus toward people of color and Muslims, during his campaign
42
43

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1995, § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018).
Indeed, scholars have argued that past practice supports construing § 212(f) as
applying only to exigent circumstances involving diplomacy or military affairs, where the
President's power is greatest. See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Scholars on the
Text and Structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act in Support of Respondents at I-

2, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
44KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44743, EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO
EXCLUDE ALIENS: IN BRIEF 7, 10 (2017); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S.

155, 187-88 (1993) (upholding legality of executive order establishing policy of Haitian
interdiction).
45
MANUEL, supra note 44, at 1-2.
46
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
47
See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 581 (1990)
(describing Mandel's distinction between "executive actions and legislative acts," the former
to "facially legitimate and bona fide" review and the latter not similarly constrained).
subject
48
See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795, 798 (1977); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2419-20 (2018); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594
(4th Cir. 2017), vacatedas moot, 138 S.Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.); Washington v. Trump, 858
F.3d 1168, 1182-83 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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and after taking the oath of office. 49 In December 2015, candidate-Trump
proposed a "complete shutdown" of Muslim entry into the United States.50 His
campaign website featured a "Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration,"
which renewed his call for a complete shutdown. 5 1 That following spring, he
stated that "Islam hates us." '52 Later that same month, he again proposed shutting
down Muslim entry. 53 After suicide bombings in Brussels, Trump told reporters,
"You have to deal with the mosques, whether we like it or not, I mean, you know
these attacks aren't.., done by Swedish people. '54 After winning the election,
the president-elect confirmed his earlier plans. 55 He also repeatedly admitted to
swapping the term "Muslim" for a focus on particular nations to evade
constitutional scrutiny. 56 Finally, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani
admitted publicly that the President considered the forthcoming policy to be a
"Muslim ban," but that the President sought Giuliani's advice about "do[ing] it
57
legally."
All of this culminated in the issuance of the first ban. On January 27, 2017,
the President's first Executive Order (EO- 1) took effect, 58 triggering "chaos" in
airports across the country. 59 Legal permanent residents who were abroad saw
their green cards canceled upon arrival,60 and other noncitizens arriving in U.S.
61
airports lost their right to enter mid-flight.
49David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Opinion, Donald Trump's Racism: The
Definitive List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/
15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-racist.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
50Id.
51

1nt'l Refugee Assistance Project,857 F.3d at 594.

52Id.
531d.
54

Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, 'I Think Islam Hates Us': A Timeline of
Trump's Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hatesus-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm term=.dc8b86ea3e85
[https://perna.cc/49JT-8RXZ].
55
Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594.
56id
57id.
58

Exec. Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States, 3. C.F.R, 2017 Comp. 272 (2017) [hereinafter EO-I].
59Katie Bo Williams, Kelly Shoulders Blame for Troubled Travel Ban Rollout, THE
HILL (Feb. 7, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/318399-kelly-shouldersblame-for-troubled-travel-ban-rollout [https://perma.cc/JG6Y-G625] ("Press reports have
characterized the initial rollout of the ban as chaotic at best, while critics of the ban labeled
it inhumane at worst."); see also Michael C. Dorf, Will the Supreme Court Back Trump's
ThirdAttempt at a Travel Ban?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/
will-supreme-court-back-trumps-third-attempt-travel-ban-790740 [https://perma.cc/SX3U47RS].
60
See Weiner & Schemm, supra note 1.
61 Trump Executive Order: White House Stands Firm over TravelBan, BBC NEwS (Jan.
30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38790629 [https://perma.cc/DU9W-
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Noncitizens' families and employers, states, and various interested
nonprofit organizations immediately challenged the ban. Several federal district
courts preliminarily enjoined the first ban, in whole or in part. 62 In the first
appellate decision addressing the validity of EO-1, the Ninth Circuit denied the
government's motion to stay the district court's nationwide injunction pending
appeal of that injunction. 63 The appeals court acknowledged the government's
substantial authority to regulate immigration but determined that "important
constitutional limitations" constrained this authority. 64 The court concluded that
the President's "policy determinations" in immigration law were entitled to
deference but were not unreviewable. 65 The court emphasized EO- l's impact
on legal permanent residents, 6 6 who have substantial constitutional rights. 67 The
court determined that the government was unlikely to succeed on appeal and
68
that the balance of hardships and the public interest militated against a stay.
69
Thus, the court denied the government's motion for a stay pending appeal.
After courts enjoined EO-1, the President issued a second Executive Order
(EO-2), this one applying again temporarily, but only to individuals abroad who
had never received a visa to travel to the United States. 70 Individuals affected
had no right of entry; some commentators argued that they lacked any
constitutional rights. 7 1 Plaintiffs challenging EO-I and EO-2 asserted statutory

4XL5] ("Those who were already mid-flight were detained on arrival - even if they held
valid US visas or other immigration permits.").
62
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (order granting temporary restraining order); Darweesh v. Trump, No.
17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (order granting
preliminary injunction). For a complete list of all legal challenges to the travel bans, see
Litigation Documents, supra note 40.
63
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
at 1162 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)).
64Id.
65
66

1d. at 1164.
1d. at 1165-66 (discussing EO-l 's impermissible impact on legal permanent

residents).
67
See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[O]nce an alien gains admission
to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his
constitutional status changes accordingly.").
68 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1167-68.
69

1d at 1169.

70

Exec. Order No. 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
States, 3 C.F.R, 2017 Comp. 301, 306-07 [hereinafter EO-2].
United
71
See Josh Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part II.The Due
Process Clause Analysis, LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2017), https://lawfareblog.com/legality-3617-

executive-order-part-ii-due-process-clause-analysis [https://perma.cc/C6HS-TD7X].
However, noncitizens' lack of a constitutional right to entry does not insulate immigration
law from judicial scrutiny where those laws impact citizens' interests. See also Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787, 807 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is irrelevant that aliens have no
constitutional right to immigrate and that Americans have no constitutional right to compel
the admission of their families. The essential fact here is that Congress did choose to extend
such privileges to American citizens but then denied them to a small class of citizens. When
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and constitutional claims, 72 arguing that the federal government, through the
President, had impermissibly disparaged Muslims as dangerous, 73 despite both
EOs' ostensible facial neutrality. 74 Even before the President promulgated these
particular travel bans, scholars had argued that the Establishment Clause would
allow plaintiffs challenging such bans to invoke structural limits on the
government's conduct, regardless of whether excluded noncitizens had
constitutional rights. 75 Thus, commentators found the courts' receptivity to the
Establishment Clause claim unsurprising.
Several courts preliminarily enjoined EO-2 as well, 76 and the eventual
appellate decisions expressed two competing visions of Mandel. The Fourth
Circuit, in affirming the district court's preliminary injunction against EO-2,
determined that the President's campaign fulminations and post-inauguration
statements disparaging Muslims constituted evidence of his improper purpose
in enacting EO-2. 7 7 The appeals court initially determined that the President's
extensive power to exclude noncitizens had no effect on plaintiffs' standing to
assert and likelihood of prevailing on their Establishment Clause claim. 78
Central to the court's analysis was the President's long history of campaign
promises, website language, and tweets regarding the need to "shut down"
Muslim immigration. 79 The court sidestepped the government's assertion of
"plenary power" by applying the logical inverse of Justice Kennedy's
Congress draws such lines among citizens, the Constitution requires that the decision
comport
with Fifth Amendment principles of equal protection and due process.").
72
Statutory claims included a claim that the travel bans violated INA § 202, which
prohibits discrimination in the issuance of visas. Constitutional claims included claims under
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 32, Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265
F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC), affd, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.),
vacated, No. 17-1194, 2018 WL 1051821 (June 28, 2018) (mem.).
73
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Int'l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC), aff'd, 883
F.3d 233 (4th Cir.), vacated, No. 17-1194, 2018 WL 1051821 (June 28, 2018) (mem.).
74
Professor Gerald Neuman has argued that EO- 1 and EO-2 were not facially neutral,
considering their multiple references to "honor" killings. See Gerald Neuman, Neither
Facially Legitimate Nor Bona Fide-Why the Very Text of the Travel Ban Shows t's
Unconstitutional,
JUST
SECURITY
(June
9,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/41953/facially-legitimate-bona-fide-why-unconstitutionaltravel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/CB5N-LKRE].
75
See Steven Vladeck, What's Missing from Constitutional Analyses of Donald
Trump's Muslim Immigration Ban, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.justsecurit
y.org/28221/missing-constitutional-analyses-donad-trumps-muslim-immigration-ban/
[https://perma.cc/UD8Z-WP74].
76
See, e.g., Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D.
Md. 2017), affd in part and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138
S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
77Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594-95 (4th Cir. 2017),
vacated as moot, 138 S.Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
78
Id. at 586.
79
1d. at 576.
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conclusion in Kerry v. Din.80 Where plaintiffs had plausibly alleged animus with
sufficient particularity, as in the instant case, the President's judgment was not
entitled to deference. 81 Thus, although a national security purpose is "facially
legitimate," the President's own statements evinced bad faith, rendering them
mere pretext-and certainly not "bona fide."8 2 Thus, the court proceeded to
apply "longstanding Establishment Clause doctrine" to EO-2. 83 The Ninth
Circuit similarly upheld a preliminary injunction against the measure but on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. 84 The court determined that EO-2
violated the Immigration and Nationality Act by "exceeding the President's
85
authority under [§ I 182(f)], discriminating on the basis of nationality."
Dissenting judges on both courts decried the majorities' lack of deference
to the President. The Fourth Circuit's dissenters faulted the majority for
considering extrinsic evidence of purpose. 86 On their view, a court cannot
review a facially neutral EO,and no evidence of purpose, even "smoking gun"
evidence of animus, may be considered. 87 A group of judges on the Ninth
Circuit expressed similar frustration when the court denied an internal motion
for rehearing en banc. 88 These judges argued that any animus the President
exhibited should not automatically invalidate the ban because the President also
claimed to have legitimate reasons for prohibiting the entry of nationals of the
designated countries.8 9 On this view, evidence of animus should never lead a
on select
court to invalidate an executive order that excludes or imposes burdens
90
order.
executive
the
for
reason
sole
noncitizens unless animus is the
Without expressing its view on the merits, the Supreme Court granted the
government's motion to stay the injunctions as to noncitizens lacking "any bona
fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States," 9 1 and, at the close
80

1d.at 592; Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015).
Refugee Assistance Project,857 F.3d at 592 (Niemeyer, J, dissenting).
nt 'l
1d.
831d.
84
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 782 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2392.
85
1d.
86
1nt 'lRefugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 647-48.
871d. at 648 ("In looking behind the face of the government's action for facts to show
the alleged bad faith, rather than looking for bad faith on the face of the executive action
itself, the majority grants itself the power to conduct an extratextual search for evidence
bad faith, which is exactly what three Supreme Court opinions have prohibited.").
suggesting
88
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting in
the denial of en banc rehearing).
89
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of en banc
rehearing) ("So long as there is one 'facially legitimate and bona fide' reason for the
President's action, our inquiry is at an end.").
901Id.
91 Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (finding
that equities balanced in favor of allowing injunction to take effect with respect to
noncitizens with "any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,"
but not with respect to those lacking such a relationship). Notably, the Court did not cite
authority for this standard, suggesting it was sui generis.
81
82
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of EO-2's 90-day duration, vacated the Fourth Circuit's order as moot.92 On
October 23, 2017, the President issued his third travel ban, this one styled as a
"Proclamation" rather than an Executive Order. 93 The Proclamation stated that
the President had concluded an extensive study of the security procedures in
specified countries and found them lacking. 94 To address purportedly
inadequate vetting procedures, he was indefinitely suspending entry from eight
countries, all majority-Muslim, except for Venezuela and North Korea. 95
Plaintiffs challenged the Proclamation as well, and federal district courts in
Hawaii and Maryland issued preliminary injunctions. 96 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed in part and vacated in part, 97 ruling that the indefinite temporal scope
of the ban and its extensive revision to terrorism-related grounds of
inadmissibility flouted the careful scheme Congress had created. 98 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 99
In Trump v. Hawaii, a majority of the Justices assumed without deciding
that they could properly consider the President's extrinsic statements of
animus.1 0 0 After offering an abridged summary of the President's anti-Muslim
animus, the Court then changed the subject, suggesting that presidents speak for
the nation in a variety of ways, citing Muslim-friendly statements by Presidents
Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush. 10 1 In so doing, the Court failed to
consider whether, consideringextrinsic statements ofanimus, the stated national
92

93

Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
See

Proclamation No. 9645,

Presidential

Proclamation

Enhancing Vetting

Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists
or Other
Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
94
Id.
95

1Id. at § 2(d), (f); cf The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling,Fear, and
Secrecy, PENN STATE LAW RIGHTS WORKING GRP. 37 n.5 (May 2012), https://pennstatelaw.
psu.edu/ file/clinics/NSEERS report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4GG-KHLW] (describing
inclusion of North Korea as a "fig leaf' to "provide political cover" for discriminatory policy
after the attacks of September 11, 2001).
96
Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1155 (D. Haw. 2017) (holding that EO's
use of national origin as a proxy for dangerousness violated the INA), affd in part and
vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). The Hawaii federal
court initially issued a TRO, which "converted to a preliminary injunction three days later."
See HILLEL R. SMITH & BEN R. HARRINGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10017,
OVERVIEW OF 'TRAVEL BAN' LITIGATION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5
97

(2018).

Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 622, 702.
1d. at 673.
99
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923, 923-24 (2018) (mem.). The Supreme Court
requested briefing on the constitutional claim. Id. at 924. In addition, after the certiorari
grant, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction
against the Proclamation on constitutional grounds. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 269 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that "the face of the Proclamation, read
in the context of President Trump's official statements, fails to demonstrate a primarily
secular purpose"), vacated, No. 17-1270, 2018 WL 1256938 (2018) (mem.).
100 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018).
I01 Id. at 2417-18.
98
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10 2
security justifications could still be characterized as "bona fide."' Instead of
10 3 the Court
requiring the government to disavow the President's animus,
merely determined that animus was not the sole motive for the bans because the
10 4 Thus, the Court
President had later articulated a national security rationale.
concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on their Establishment Clause
claim. 10 5 Having reached the same conclusion with respect to plaintiffs'
grant of a preliminary
statutory claims, the Court reversed the lower court's
06
proceedings.]
further
for
remanded
and
injunction
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
determined that Mandel applied to individual visa or waiver adjudications, but
not to a presidential exclusion order. 10 7 She then analyzed the President's
animus at greater length. 10 8 Applying traditional Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, she determined that a reasonable observer would understand the
exclusion order to have the "primary purpose" of expressing anti-Muslim
hostility. 1' 9 Justices Breyer and Kagan also dissented, discerning the exclusion
order's unlawful purpose from the waiver provision's function as mere "window
dressing."' 10
The Supreme Court's preliminary resolution of the litigation leaves a
number of issues unsettled. What is the relevance of the President's extrinsic
statements in the analysis, assuming, as the majority did, that the Court has the
power to "look behind" the face of the order? Will national security always
defeat animus, no matter how convincing the evidence of illegitimate motive,
and how flimsy the evidence of a national security rationale? Does the necessity
or sufficiency of these two motives matter? On remand, courts must determine
the proper analysis, as the Supreme Court assumed the appropriate framework
without deciding it.

102

See Adam Cox et al., The Radical Supreme Court Travel Ban Opinion-But Why It
Might Not Apply to Other Immigrants' Rights Cases, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2018),
https://www.j ustsecurity.org/585 10/radical-supreme-court-travel-ban-opinion-but-applyimmigrants-rights-cases/ [https://perma.cc/KU4V-MXAQ].
103
The topic of a disavowal arose at oral argument, with Chief Justice Roberts asking
whether a disavowal of animus now would cure the constitutional defect; plaintiffs' counsel
conceded that it would. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
104 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (characterizing as "legitimate" the
Proclamation's purpose of "preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately
vetted.").
10 5 Id.at 2423.

1061Id.

10 7 1d. at 2440 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

10 8 Id. at 2443.
109Id. at 2445.
110 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Immigration law's "plenary power" doctrine, first announced in the
nineteenth century Chinese Exclusion Case,111 has traditionally required
deference to congressional judgments-including animus1 12 -but subsequent
developments in constitutional law have raised doubts about the legality and
desirability of such a result. 113 When analyzing how direct evidence of animus
alters deference, a court faces the question not merely of whether to defer, but
to what extent. 114 If impermissible motive matters at all, a reviewing court will
have to select a motive standard. 115 In his illuminating study of mixed motive
standards across the law, Professor Andrew Verstein argues that the multitude
of motive standards that courts use generally correspond to only four standards:
sole, but-for, primary, and any. 116 "Sole motive" favors defendants strongly, as
it leads a court to invalidate a law only where an improper motive-such as
racial animus-is the "sole motive" for the challenged act. 117 The presence of
any proper motive, thus, leads to a defense victory. The "but-for" motive
standard also favors the defense and supports invalidation only where an
improper motive is necessary."18 The "primary motive" standard requires only
that the plaintiff prove that the improper motive was greater in magnitude than
the proper motive, even if both reasons are sufficient on their own.1 19 Thus, a
plaintiff could recover based on a defendant's impermissible racial animus, even
if the defendant would have made the same decision anyway, so long as
defendant's racial animus exceeds its non-racist motive. Finally, the "any
motive" standard favors plaintiffs, as it supports invalidation upon a showing of
"taint," the existence of any improper motive behind the challenged act.1 20
The travel ban litigation in the lower courts revealed two conflicting
approaches to deference amid direct evidence of animus, and unsurprisingly,
judges' choice of a motive standard governed the result. Judge Bybee and other
111 The Chinese Exclusion Case involved a challenge to an Act of Congress. See Chae
Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1889).
l12M, at 596; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that Congress is responsible for immigration laws, even
if those laws reflect "xenophobia generally").
113For one, the Equal Protection Clause had not yet been read into the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to apply to the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954); see also Kagan, supra note 24, at 90 (arguing that immigration law's
tolerance
for animus has diminished but remains uncertain).
114
Cf Horwitz, supra note 21, at 1066 ("The relationship between deference and the
law's contextual dilemma is complex. But it is clear that there is an intimate relationship
between
these two phenomena.").
115
Cf Richard Fallon, ConstitutionallyForbiddenLegislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV.

523, 529 (2016) (arguing that courts should never invalidate laws "solely because of the
subjective intentions of those who enacted it") (emphasis added).
116
Verstein, supra note 36, at 1159.
li71d at 1139.
118
d. at 1137.
1191d.at 1134.
120ld. at 1141.
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standard, which
dissenting judges on the Ninth Circuit endorsed a "sole motive"
1 2 1 This standard
upholds an exclusion law unless animus is the sole motive.
assures a government victory in nearly all cases, for the government can almost
22
always articulate a post-hoc rationalization for a discriminatory law.' This
view guts Mandel by requiring only facial legitimacy, thus representing one
extreme on the deference spectrum. The other extreme, exemplified by the
majority decision in IRAP v. Trump, however, strips the government of
deference upon a showing of any animus. 123 Although this might sound like a
"but-for" test, further analysis reveals it resembles the "taint" theory more
closely: good faith is a precondition for deference, and the presence of any
animus means the precondition has not been met.' 24 This motive standard in
connection with exclusion, however, risks exposing sensitive political
judgments to an exacting level of scrutiny--one that the Supreme Court has
suggested is better suited for a discriminatory state law rather than a presidential
exclusion order. 125 Thus, the travel ban litigation displays two approaches to
analyzing the fundamental question running through challenges to successive
EOs.
The Supreme Court's resolution, too, rested on choice of motive
standard. 12 6 In allowing a post-hoc national security justification to immunize
an order otherwise infected with animus, the Court adopted the "sole motive"
standard described above. 127 The Court's application of this standard, however,

12 1

See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); cf Verstein, supra note 36, at 1139-41 (describing the
sole motive standard).
122 Other judges have questioned the use of extrinsic evidence of animus, but for reasons
explained below, our constitutional jurisprudence allows reliance on such evidence,
especially when vindicating equality interests. Cf Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554, 648 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), vacating as moot, 138 S. Ct.
(2017) (mem.).
353 123
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591. The majority characterized
EO-2 as "solely" motivated by animus, but the court did not engage in any analysis regarding
the quantum of animus vis-A-vis stated reasons for the ban, such as national security. As a
result, the court did not engage in a mixed motives inquiry, instead adopting an all-or-nothing
approach. Any showing of animus meant the entire motive was animus. Professor Fallon
argues that courts should subject a challenged statute to heightened scrutiny where legislators
have breached their "deliberative obligations" by pursuing "constitutionally forbidden aims
or ... tak[ing] official actions based on constitutionally forbidden motives," specifically
where greater than half the legislators have forbidden subjective intent. See Fallon, supra
note 115, at 530. On this reasoning, a unitary actor, the President, possessing a forbidden
intent might similarly render the "norms of deference" inapplicable. Id
subjective
124
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591.
12 5
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392,2418 (2018); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 375 (1971) (holding that state laws limiting welfare benefits to citizens violate
rights to equal protection).
noncitizens'
12 6
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420.
1271_d.
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undermines its stated power to consider plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence. 128 That is,
the Court "considered" plaintiffs' evidence by actually considering only the
government's evidence. Once the government articulated a national security
objective and offered supporting facts, the plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence did not
matter at all. This turns Mandel on its head, allowing the government to
demonstrate the "bona fide" nature of its "facially legitimate" reason without
considering any facts showing that the stated reason is a sham. Moreover, in
selecting the "sole motive" standard, the Court mischaracterized a number of
cases-principally Korematsu,129 but also the Equal Protection animus cases. 130
Justice Sotomayor's rival analysis calls for examining the allegations with
clear eyes, 13 1 but her use of the "primary purpose" standard is similarly
vulnerable to critique. Although it differs slightly from the "taint" standard used
by the Fourth Circuit in IRAP v. Trump, it rejects deference and calls for
invalidation when animus predominates over legitimate justifications. Although
a reasonable approach, it overlooks the possibility that an exclusion order can
have more than one independently sufficient justification. Thus, the Supreme
Court's analysis of the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on their Establishment
Clause claim is vulnerable on many counts, and the need remains for a
compelling analysis of plenary power and animus.
III. PLENARY POWER DEFERENCE

Understanding the role of deference in immigration law 13 2 requires
explaining the concept of deference generally and briefly retelling the history of
the so-called "plenary power doctrine." Since its origins in the nineteenth
century, the plenary power doctrine has taken on different meanings: initially, it
meant absolute federal power over borders, as well as the nonjusticiability of
challenges to immigration law. 133 Through the twentieth century, it evolved
from strict nonjusticiability to a highly deferential standard of review.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled that it will uphold decisions excluding
noncitizens from entry so long as the government advances a "facially legitimate
12 8

Id.("[W]e assume that we may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent
of applying rational basis review.").
129 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii,
138 13
S.0Ct. at 2423.
13 1

See infra Part IV.

See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2433-35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
1321 am referring here to constitutionaldeference, not other forms of deference, such as
courts' deference to agency interpretations of statutes under the Chevron doctrine. Cf Daniel
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US.
Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 707 (1997) (describing the "extraordinary
constitutional deference" the Court gives to Congress and the Executive in immigration
matters).
133 NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 138. In the travel ban litigation, the government has
argued that the President's exclusion decisions are unreviewable by the judiciary.
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and bona fide" reason for the exclusion.' 3 4 While developments in constitutional
law over the last century have eroded the plenary power doctrine's scope,
especially as to procedural due process claims and challenges to indefinite
detention, 135 courts have not extended these developments to first-time visa
applicants with no existing ties to the United3 6 States-the very population
excluded by the President's revised travel ban.]
Before defining deference and tracing the path of the plenary power
doctrine, it is important to note that both the courts and Congress circumscribe
the President's role in exclusion law. Congress possesses principal authority to
regulate immigration. 13 7 The Chinese Exclusion Case announced plenary power
8
in the course of considering the validity of a congressional act. 13 Although the
Supreme Court has not always clearly distinguished between congressional and
presidential authority in immigration law, 139 the Court has repeatedly noted that
"over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete.' 140 Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have argued that
Congress's power vis-it-vis the President is greater at the "front end," when
screening noncitizens for admission, while the President's power is greater at
14 1 Thus, while
the "back end," when selecting noncitizens for removal.
Congress has tremendous latitude in defining the criteria of admission and
removal, the President retains significant discretion to determine the proper
targets for removal.1 42 Ultimately, the President's delegated authority in the
143 but
realm of exclusion is a small part of a comprehensive legislative scheme,
the President's responsibilities in foreign, diplomatic, and military affairs have
often led courts to defer to the President's judgments in immigration law as well.
For this reason, a full discussion of the evolution of plenary power is useful.

134

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
135 See Yarnataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigration Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903)
("[Tihis court has never held... that administrative

officers ...

may disregard

the

fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law."'); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
695 (2001); Motomura, supra note 47, at 587.
678,136
See Motomura, supra note 47, at 587.
137Id. at 553.
138

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606-07

(1889).

139

See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 461 ("[T]he Court's continued inattention to
the scope of the President's power over immigration policy has given rise to doctrinal
confusion.").
140
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (emphasis added).
141 Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 463-65 (further arguing for the President to have
greater authority in front-end screening).
142 Id. at 464.
143

See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Scholars on the Text & Structure of the
Immigration & Nationality Act in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018) (No. 17-965).
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A. Defining Deference
Deference is born of discretion. "[D]iscretion is the power given to a person
with authority to choose between two or more alternatives, when each of the
alternatives is lawful."' 144 Discretion would be illusory without deference, as
courts could nullify an actor's choice without granting that actor the flexibility
or discretionthey are supposed to have.
Deference is "a decisionmaker following a determination made by some
other individual or institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it
decided the same question independently.' ' 145 In essence, deference is where a
decisionmaker sets aside "its own judgment" and follows "the judgment of
another decisionmaker... in circumstances in which the deferring
decisionmaker... might have reached a different decision. ' 146 Scholars have
identified two bases of deference: legal authority and expertise. 14 7 Deference
based on legal authority is a "status-based" justification and appears, for
example, when courts are reviewing judgments of the political branches or
administrative agencies. 148 On this view, judicial deference to agencies is based
primarily on Congress's implied delegation of lawmaking power to agencies,
thus exemplifying "legal authority" deference. 149 Deference based on expertise,
or "epistemic authority," on the other hand, refers to the superior knowledge of
the decisionmaker receiving deference, or its "comparative institutional
150
competence."
"Norms of deference" typically require decisionmakers to act in good
faith, 15 1 while animus reveals bad faith. 152 Thus, if good faith is a precondition
of deference, animus could very well defeat deference. Whether a good faith
requirement makes sense as a prerequisite to deference depends on what work
deference is doing. When an entity's expertise drives a court's deference, a court
144 AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION
14 5

7 (1989).
Horwitz, supra note 21, at 1072 (2008) (citing Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial

Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 656, 665 (2000)); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?
Implied Delegations,Agency Expertise, and the MisplacedLegacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN.

L. REv. 735, 742 (explaining that Chevronjustified deference to administrative agencies on
the implied delegation rationale instead of expertise).
146 Horwitz,supra note 21, at 1073.
1471d.at 1078; Krotoszynski, supra note 145, at 737.
148 Horwitz,supra note 21, at 1080.
149 Id

150Id.at 1085.
151 See Fallon, supra note 115, at 530.
152See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (state law violated equal

protection where it was based purely on the moral disapproval of same-sex relationships);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)) (stating that a "bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest" to create law); Susannah W. Pollvogt,
UnconstitutionalAnimus, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 887, 888 (2012).
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seeks to permit the presumptively superior judgment of the entity to prevail, to
avoid second-guessing a judgment call. 153 Thus, a consular official reviewing a
visa application is entitled to deference because of her superior knowledge of
154
Accordingly, a court will
local conditions and expertise in adjudicating visas.
not substitute its judgment for that of the consular official absent a showing of
bad faith. 155 Where the whole point of deference is to enable better policymaking, or better individual decisions, it makes sense to reduce or even
eliminate deference when the evidence shows that the decisionmaker is
156
motivated by bad faith.
When structural considerations dominate a court's deference, however, a
court applies only the mildest form ofjudicial review in order to preserve space
for "rough-hewn"' 157 measures that make no pretense of being betterpolicy, but
158
Here, an
instead, reflect legal judgments about the allocation of power.
implied good faith requirement makes less sense because the rationale for
deference is not to enhance the quality of policy or individual decisions; instead,
deference functions simply to honor an allocation of responsibility between
branches of the government. 159 Decisions entrusted to the President are
entrusted to him, regardless of how he executes them.1 60 Given the dual nature
of deference to the President in immigration law, based both on expertise and
legal authority, a good faith requirement is plausible but not inevitably
16 1
correct.
1 62
Immigration deference follows from the political branches' discretion.
When actors-whether the President or a prosecutor--have discretion to make
judgments, to carefully balance a range of factors, courts typically scrutinize
those actors' decisions less rigorously. 163 Courts defer to decisions made in
another actor's lawful exercise of discretion. 164 Those actors are given the
153

See Horwitz, supranote 21, at 1104 n.215.
See James A.R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH.
L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1991).
155 See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156 See id; Fallon, supra note 115, at 530 (arguing for elevated judicial scrutiny where
legislators have breached their deliberative obligations).
157 Martin, supra note 13, at 47.
158
Horwitz, supra note 21, at 1080.
154

159 See id.
160 See id.
16 1

See id.at 1080. But see Andrew Kent et al., FaithfulExecution and Article 11, 132
HARV. L. REV. (2019) (forthcoming June 2019), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?
abstract id=3260593 [https://perma.cc/RC3H-D36D] (arguing that Article II of the
Constitution limits "presidents only to exercise their power when it is motivated in the public

interest rather than in their private self-interest, consistent with fiduciary obligation in the
private law").
162
Kanstroom, supra note 132, at 709 ("Indeed, U.S. immigration law.., might best be
described as a fabric of discretion and judicial deference.").
163 Horwitz, supra note 21, at 1079.
164 Id
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flexibility and freedom to arrive at the result they think best. 165 Immigration
deference in part recognizes the need for the President and Congress to use their
discretion without the judiciary's intrusion, 166 and this discretion to establish
exclusion criteria is best illustrated by the nineteenth and twentieth century
plenary power cases.
B. PlenaryPower in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
The Supreme Court established the plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan
Pingv. UnitedStates, also known as the ChineseExclusion Case.16 7 Ping was a
Chinese national who had lived in San Francisco for a dozen years, arriving well
before the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.168 In 1868, the United States had
entered into a treaty with China to permit migration by Chinese nationals such
as him. 169 However, racism and fears of economic competition fueled domestic
frustration with Chinese immigration, prompting Congress to pass the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, suspending immigration of additional Chinese
laborers. 170 Before leaving on a visit to China in 1887, Ping obtained a
certificate, to which he was entitled, to ensure reentry to the United States. 17 1
One week before his return to the United States in 1888, however, Congress
passed the Scott Act, declaring all reentry certificates invalid, and barring all
Chinese laborers from re-entering the country.172 Accordingly, when Ping
arrived on a ship at the port of San Francisco, the shipmaster detained him. 173
Ping filed a habeas corpus action, and the lower courts denied his petition. 174
The Supreme Court, upon review, held that Ping had no right to enter based on
his certificate, the United States' treaty commitment notwithstanding, because
Congress had overridden his authorization with the Scott Act. 17 5 In a decision
with numerous references to the inherent authority of sovereign nations to
control their borders, as well as racist language decrying the Chinese as
165Id. at 1085.

166 See Martin, supra note 13, at 38 (noting that judicial deference to immigration action
arose from "the Court's understanding of proper institutional roles, given the complex
dynamics in the foreign affairs realm").
16 7
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889); Gabriel J. Chin, The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 7, 11
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). An excellent and classic source for the
history of Chinese immigrants' rights litigation is CHARLES MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF
EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY

AMERICA (1994). I thank Jean Stefancic for directing me to it.
168 Chin, supra note 167, at 7.
1691Id. at 8.
170

Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 599; Chin, supra note 167, at 8, 11.
171 Chin, supra note 167, at 11.

172 _1d.

173Id. at 12.
174Id. at 12.
175 Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600-02.
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unassimilable, the Court determined that it lacked the power to decide questions
regarding the validity of the statute, even amid claims that the statute violated
an earlier treaty commitment. 1 7 6 The Court described Congress's expansive
exclusion power, reasoning:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do
not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it
could not exclude7 aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of
17
another power.
The Court further quoted an earlier decision of Chief Justice Marshall,
noting that the jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory "is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed of by itself."1 78 Viewing migration as
a matter between sovereigns, the United States' decision to cede control would
effectively transfer power to another sovereign. 179 The Court further referenced
both the Legislature's and the Executive's longstanding power to exclude
foreigners, but this act of combining the political branches, or speaking of them
as though their powers were coextensive, was carefully dismantled only
paragraphs later. 180 Specifically, the Court distinguished the Chinese Exclusion
Act from a contemporaneous law that granted the President the authority to
expel dangerous noncitizens, noting that the latter "was passed during a period
of great political excitement," "was never brought to the test ofj udicial decision
in the courts of the United States," and regardless, was not before the Court
18
presently. 1
Scholars have argued that, despite numerous references to sovereignty, the
Chinese Exclusion Case is not about sovereignty. 182 The dominant interest,
instead, is federalism, specifically, establishing federal primacy vis-i-vis the
states in making and enforcing immigration law.1 83 However, emphasizing
interpretation
federalism over sovereignty does not defeat the "absolute power"
84
advances.'
Case
Exclusion
Chinese
the
that
power
of plenary
1761d at 602.
177 ld.at 603-04.
178 1d at 604.
1791d

1801d. at 607, 610.
181 Chinese Exclusion Case, 130

U.S. at 611.

182 Martin, supra note 13, at 31.
183 Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 610; Martin, supra note 13, at 35.
184
Other exclusion cases reinforced this result. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, a
Japanese immigrant challenged her exclusion under the public charge ground of
inadmissibility. 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892). The governing statute empowered immigration
officials to exclude noncitizens in their sole discretion, and the Supreme Court determined
that the statute was valid under the federal government's "inherent" immigration power. Id
at 659, 663; see Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons
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The Supreme Court continued interpreting plenary power as "absolute
power" in a number of cases throughout the twentieth century, relying on a mix
of national security and inherent authority justifications. In Knauff v.
Shaughnessy,the Supreme Court held that an immigration regulation authorized
the Attorney General to exclude a foreign wife of an American veteran husband
on national security grounds without notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to
respond, even though Congress had provided for the admission of such wives
under the War Brides Act. 185 The Court observed that the political branches'
"inherent authority" to exclude noncitizens emanated from its power to control
the nation's foreign affairs. 186 Thus, during a national emergency, Congress
could properly delegate that power to the President, and in so doing, it could
authorize a "broad exercise" of power, even if it seemingly conflicted with a
statute granting the privilege of entry. 18 7 In a famous encapsulation of the
plenary power doctrine's vast reach at the time, the Court ruled, "Whatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned." 188 Such a rule licenses Congress to define its own
constraints, with a promise of nonjusticiability to boot. Unsurprisingly, this
conception of due process prompted multiple dissents.
The dissenting Justices interpreted the War Brides Act not to permit the
Attorney General to exclude the foreign wife of an American veteran husband
without traditional due process protections.189 Justice Frankfurter reasoned that,
through the War Brides Act, Congress intended to extend the privilege of entry
to the foreign brides of American veterans of World War 1.190 He found it
improbable that the exclusion regulation permitted the Attorney General to
exclude Knauff, considering the statute. 191 Justice Jackson invoked the
avoidance canon of statutory interpretation, concluding that "Congress will have
to use much more explicit language" to authorize breaking up an American
citizen's family and finding "serious misconduct" by his noncitizen wife
without notice, evidence, and an opportunity to be heard. 192
Similarly, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, the Supreme Court
upheld the permanent exclusion and indefinite detention of a noncitizen, without
a hearing, based on secret information. 193 Mezei hailed from Romania and had
lived for many years in Buffalo, New York, with his American citizen wife. 19 4
from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 946 (1995)
(describing NishimuraEkiu).
185 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
186 1d. For criticism of the nexus between immigration and foreign affairs as overblown,
see NEUMAN,
supra note 18, at 135.
187
Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543.

188Id.at 544.

189Id.at 548-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1901d.at 549-50.
191 id.

1921d.at 551-52 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
193 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953).
1941d.at 208.
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He left the United States to visit his dying mother in Eastern Europe and returned
after nineteen months.1 95 Although Mezei succeeded in obtaining a visa from
Europe to travel to the United States, he was temporarily excluded upon
arrival.1 9 6 Instead of admitting Mezei, the government detained him at Ellis
Island pending the Attorney General's final decision. 1 9 7 Once the Attorney
General deemed him permanently excludable, again, without a hearing, and
based on secret evidence, the government tried to find a third country to take
him.' 9 8 None would. 199 Accordingly, Mezei remained stranded at Ellis Island
indefinitely. 20 0 The Court described detention powers during times of national
emergency as expansive and coextensive with the power to exclude. 20 1 The
Court determined that Mezei had broken his continuing presence in the United
States, thus rendering him an excludable noncitizen rather than a returning
20 2
permanent resident entitled to greater constitutional protections.
Notwithstanding Mezei's actual detention on U.S. soil, i.e., at Ellis Island, the
Court regarded him as not yet "on the threshold," thus outside the scope of
20 3
constitutional protection.
The dissenters acknowledged the vast power to exclude but deemed
unconstitutional Mezei's indefinite detention without procedural due process. In
his stirring dissent, Justice Jackson argued that preventive detention itself did
not violate substantive due process, but that indefinite detention of individuals
based on future dangerousness, determined by secret evidence and without a
hearing, was unconstitutional, even for an excludable noncitizen. 20 4 This view
suggests that even excludable noncitizens might have a procedural due process
right to know the basis of their continued detention, even if not a right to
20 5
challenge substantive exclusion provisions.
The Knauff and Mezei view of plenary power as absolute tolerates outright
animus, 20 6 but a series of cases subsequently revealed a potential role for
judicial review of substantive removal criteria. In Harisiades,the Court rejected
First Amendment and Fifth Amendment challenges to the Alien Registration
Act as applied to a long-time resident of the United States and Greek national
whom the government sought to deport for past membership in the Communist
195 1d
196Id
197 Id

198 Id. at 209.
199AMezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
200 Id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 210.

202ld. at 214. The Court recognized these greater protections for permanent residents in
KwongHai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
2 03
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212; see also Weisselberg, supranote 184, at 951 (discussing role
of "entry fiction").
204
Mezei, 345 U.S. at 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 05
See id.
206
See id at 210 (majority opinion); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 543 (1950).
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Party.20 7 The Court ruled that the expulsion of long-time resident noncitizens,
"'apractice that bristles with severities," was nonetheless an important foreign
policy tool "inherent in every sovereign state," 2 08 and that the Court could not
declare "congressional alarm" about the Communist threat "a fantasy or a
pretense." 20 9 This language suggests, however, that were a congressional
enactment to lack any basis in fact, judicial review might be warranted, thus
distinguishing the view from an "absolute power" view.2 10 Moreover, the Court
held that immigration statutes are "largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference," 2 1 1 suggesting the possibility of some judicial involvement.2 12
The opinions in Harisiadescaptured the full spectrum of the debate. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter described the exclusion power as
2 13
virtually boundless:
But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may
have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the
responsibility belongs to Congress. Courts do enforce the requirements
imposed by Congress upon officials in administering immigration laws.., and
the requirement of Due Process may entail certain procedural observances ....
But the underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to enter
and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively
to determine even though such determination may be deemed to offend
American traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace. 2 14
Critically, Justice Frankfurter spoke of Congress, not the President. 2 15
However, the Supreme Court has not always distinguished Congress and the
President when discussing the federal immigration power.2 16 Regardless,
Justice Frankfurter's description of "crude and cruel" immigration laws 2 17
perfectly captures the costs of immigration deference-the potential for poor
design, harsh impact, as well as animus.
In contrast, the dissenting Justices characterized the removal power as one
implied from sovereignty, and thus, subservient to the express guarantees of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 2 18 Expressing skepticism about the
2 07
208

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596 (1952).
Id at 587-88.
209Id.at 590.
2 10

See

id
2 11
Harisiades,342
2 12

U.S. at 580 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See Peter H. Schuck, Kleindienst v. Mandel: Plenary Power v. the Professors, in
IMMIGRATION
STORIES 186 (Peter H. Schuck & David A. Martin eds., 2005).
2 13
See Harisiades,342 U.S. at 596-99 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

214Id.at 597.
2 15

2 16

See id

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976) (noting that "reasons that preclude
judicial review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions
made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization").
2 17
Harisiades,342 U.S. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2181d.at 599 (Douglas, ., dissenting).
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very notion of "inherent authority," the dissent rejected the notion of2 19a
permanent taint from, in this case, past membership in the Communist Party.
Specifically, the dissenters rejected the majority's conclusive presumption that
2 20 The
past membership means a person is "forever dangerous to our society.
dissent specifically rejected the view of Congress's deportation power as
substantively boundless, noting that absolute power would be "inconsistent with
law which we have developed for the protection
the philosophy of constitutional
22 1
of resident aliens."
Decades later, the Supreme Court articulated a much more robust, albeit still
highly deferential, vision of judicial review of the Attorney General's
discretionary decision to exclude a noncitizen. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the
Court upheld the Attorney General's decision not to waive a finding of a
noncitizen's inadmissibility because the Attorney General had offered a
222 In that case,
"facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for the waiver denial.
Ernest Mandel, a renowned Marxist professor, had obtained a visa to speak at
223
Stanford and other universities during a trip to the United States. On previous
trips, he had unwittingly violated the terms of his visa. 224 Everyone, including
the Supreme Court, seemed to understand the real reason was the Attorney
225 Even though "bona fide" can mean
General's distaste for his Marxist'22views.
"genuine" and "in good faith, 6 the Court declined to consider possible
pretext. 227 nstead, it accepted the government's explanation for the denial, here
22 8 Such a reason
that Mandel had previously violated the terms of his visas.
2 29
scrutiny.
further
from
would insulate a consular officer's decision
The Supreme Court cases that discuss Mandel have reaffirmed the
standard's limited strength. In Fiallo v. Bell, the Court upheld the validity of a
statute that conditioned an immigration benefit on both the sex of the parent and
the legitimacy of the parent-child relationship, which plaintiffs assailed as
"'double-barreled' discrimination." 230 In that case, Congress made an
immigration privilege available to illegitimate children of American citizen
mothers or foreign mothers of illegitimate citizen children, but not to
2 19

1d. at 598.

220 Id.

221 id.
222408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
223Id. at 756-57.
224 d. at 758 (noting that Mandel "had engaged in activities beyond the stated purpose"

a previous trip to the United States).
during
22 5
See Schuck, supra note 212, at 182-83 ("It did not trouble [Justice] Blackmun that
[the reason given for refusing Mandel a waiver of his inadmissibility] was certainly a sham
and 2a26pretext.").
See Bona Fide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2018), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
[https://perma.cc/QE3E-4QAB].
dictionarylbona%20fide
2 27
See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762.
2281d

229 Id.
2 30

Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977).
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illegitimate children of American citizen fathers or foreign fathers of
illegitimate citizen children. 2 31 Rejecting Equal Protection and Due Process
challenges, the Court ruled that Congress's plenary power in immigration law
authorized its use of illegitimacy as a rough measure of the closeness of ties
between fathers and illegitimate children. 2 32 Thus, the Court has applied the
Mandel standard to a federal statute, albeit not in the exclusion context, and not
simply to individual consular decisions. 233
The Supreme Court's other discussion of Mandel prior to the travel ban
litigation occurred in Kerry v. Din.234 In that case, Din, a U.S. citizen, sought to
compel an explanation for the denial of a visa to her Afghan husband, but the
Court rejected Din's claim. 23 5 In its visa denial, the U.S. State Department cited
8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B), which renders inadmissible any noncitizen who has
engaged in terrorist activity, 2 36 but the explanation offered no details as to what
activity her husband had engaged in or what evidence the government had
considered. 23 7 Applying Mandel, Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion
reasoned that Din had received a reason that was "facially legitimate and bona
fide." 2 38 Citing a statutory basis of ineligibility constituted a "facially
legitimate" reason because Congress has plenary power to define the grounds
of inadmissibility, and the consular officer cited one of these grounds. 239 The
citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) also satisfied the requirement for a "bona
fide factual basis" because the statute defines factual predicates. 2 40 Even though
the State Department had given the plaintiff in Mandel a much more detailed
description of the basis of his visa denial, i.e., his noncompliance with the
conditions of his prior visas, Mandel involved a provision granting the Attorney
General "nearly unbridled discretion" to adjudicate waivers. 24 1 In contrast, the
State Department had applied a statutory ground for inadmissibility in the Din
Case. 2 42 Justice Kennedy also noted that Din had admitted that her husband had
worked for the Taliban, which provided "at least a facial connection to terrorist
231 Id. at 798.
232Id. at 799-80. But see Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1686 (2017)
(invalidating gender-based classification in immigration law on equal protection grounds
without any mention of plenary power or Fiallo).
233
See Fiallo,430 U.S. at 799.
234
Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2130 (2015).
23
5

236

Id. at 2131.

See id. at 2132 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(aX3)(B) (2012)).
237,1d.

238 ld. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554, 590 n.15 ("We agree that Justice Kennedy's opinion sets forth the narrowest
grounds for the Court's holding in Din and likewise recognize it as the controlling opinion.").
2 39

24 0

Id. at 2140.

See Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 212
(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012)).
241 Id. at 2140-41 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)).
242Id. at 2141.
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activity." 24 3 Crucially, he noted that the Court lacked the authority to "look
behind" the government's stated reason for denying Din's husband's visa,
"[a]bsent an affirmative showing of bad faith on the part of the consular officer
who denied [Din's husband] a visa," "plausibly alleged with sufficient
particularity." 244 Notably absent from Mandel, Fiallo, and Din was any direct
evidence of government animus.
C. PlenaryPower and Equal Protection
Modem plenary power doctrine has receded with respect to procedural due
process, and to some extent, equal protection. Specifically, the Supreme Court
has applied equal protection's rational basis review to federal alienage
classifications. 24 5 However, beyond these settings, courts have avoided issuing
explicitly constitutional decisions announcing the scope of immigrants'
rights.246 In particular, courts evaluating noncitizens' equal protection
challenges to immigration laws (as opposed to non-immigration laws that
distinguish on the basis of alienage) have relied on the constitutional avoidance
canon to interpret the relevant statutes or regulations as not authorizing
discrimination. 247 For example, in Jean v. Nelson, a class of Haitian asylum
seekers challenged the practice of the Immigration and Nationality Service
(INS) to detain all arriving Haitians. 248 The asylum seekers asserted a range of
claims, statutory and constitutional, 249 including that the INS's implementation
2 50
The district
of the parole regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause.
25 1
and the Eleventh Circuit
court granted the asylum seekers' statutory claim,
affrmed on constitutional grounds. 252 Rehearing the case en banc, the Eleventh
Circuit determined that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of Due Process did
not apply to "unadmitted" noncitizens, considering the government's plenary

243 Id.

2441Id.
24 5

1n Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court upheld a statute making a public

supplemental medical insurance program available to citizens and only some noncitizens,
namely, those who had resided in the United States for at least five years. 426 U.S. 67, 87
(1976). Finding the statutory provision "unquestionably reasonable," the Court dismissed
plaintiffs' equal protection challenge, which had alleged invidious discrimination based on
alienage. Id.at 83. Diaz confirmed the political branches' flexibility to distinguish between
citizens and noncitizens, and further, among different classes of noncitizens, for purposes of
distributing benefits. Id.at 81. But it also confirmed the applicability of rational basis review
distinctions. Id.at 83.
to such
24 6
Motomura, supra note 47, at 573.
24 7
1d
248 Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985).
249 Id.

2501d. at 849.
251Id. at 850.
252 d.at 851.
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authority to control its borders. 253 Upon review, the Supreme Court determined
that the INS parole regulations did not authorize race or national origin
54
discrimination, thus obviating the need to reach the constitutional question. 2
Instead, the Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remanded to the
district court to consider whether INS officers were in fact honoring the
regulation's race neutrality. 2 55 In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan decried
the majority's failure to provide a constitutional remedy. 2 56 The dissent further
rejected broad dicta from Mezei suggesting that "an undocumented alien

detained at the border does not enjoy any constitutional protections," noting that
this dicta "can withstand neither the weight of logic nor that of principle, and
has never been incorporated into the fabric of our constitutional
2 57
jurisprudence."
Other cases have indicated, without expressly holding, that noncitizens lack
constitutional protection from selective enforcement. In Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, for example, noncitizens sought to enjoin
deportation proceedings against them because the Attorney General had
allegedly targeted them for deportation due to their political affiliation with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 2 58 Such targeting, they claimed,
violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.2 59 While the Attorney General
was appealing the district court's grant of an injunction to the noncitizens,
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act (ITRIRA), which stripped the federal courts ofjurisdiction to
review a range of decisions by the Attorney General. 260 The Supreme Court
decided that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the selective enforcement
claim. 2 6 1 Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that selective enforcement claims are
especially rare and weak because they "invade a special province of the
Executive-its prosecutorial discretion. '2 62 In dicta, the Court denied that
noncitizens had any constitutional right to assert a selective enforcement claim,
emphasizing the importance of Executive discretion in this realm and the "less
compelling" interests of noncitizens who are deportable regardless. 263 However,
Justice Scalia reserved judgment on "the possibility of a rare case in which the
alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing
253 d.at 852.
254Jean, 472 U.S. at 857.
255_d at 857.
256Id.at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2571d.at 868 n.69.
2 58

Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 473 (1999); see also
Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The PrecariousStatus of Non-Citizen Speech
Under the FirstAmendment, 57 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1266 (2016) (discussing Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination
Comm.).
2 59
Am. -Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 525 U.S. at 474.

260Id.at 475.

261 Id. at 476, 492.
262Id.at 489.
263 Id. at 491.
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considerations can be overcome." 264 Thus, although noncitizens generally have
no constitutional right against selective enforcement, it remains an open
question whether noncitizens with direct evidence of animus might persuade the
federal courts to intervene.
Plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of animus continued to fail in challenging
immigration regulations on equal protection grounds after the attacks against
the United States on September 11, 2001. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1303(a), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instituted the National Security EntryExit Registration System (NSEERS) for male noncitizens from specified
with
countries, almost all Muslim or Arab. 26 5 Those found not in compliance
2 66 Civil
proceedings.
deportation
in
placed
were
existing immigration laws
26 7
liberties groups challenged NSEERS, but no court invalidated the program.
In Rajah v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit rejected petitioners' equal protection
claim specifically. 268 The court recognized the political branches' broad power
in immigration and noted that only rational basis review applied to the special
registration regulation. 269 Considering the national security threat that 9/11
revealed, the government could rationally require foreign nationals, Muslim and
non-Muslim, from majority-Muslim countries to register without offending the
Constitution. 270 The NSEERS challengers, however, lacked direct evidence of
or
animus, and the regulation's mere focus on foreign nationals from Muslim
2 71
hostility.
of
form
that
of
inference
an
support
to
failed
Arab countries
Despite numerous failed equal protection challenges to immigration laws,
and the Supreme Court's "green light" to animus-based exclusion policy in its
initial resolution of the travel ban litigation, 272 the proper framework for
analyzing plenary power and animus requires greater clarification. Accordingly,

2641d.
26

5 Immigration and Nationality Act § 263(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (2012); see also Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law NationalSecurity Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669, 692
(2017); see also PENN STATE LAW RIGHTS WORKING GRP., supra note 95 (discussing the
effects of NSEERS).
266

See Kareem Shora & Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, NSEERS: The Consequences of

America's Efforts to Secure Its Borders, AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM. 11 (Mar.

31, 2009), http://www.adc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NSEERS-ADC-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8QVK-N2NK].
26 7
Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 448 (2d Cir. 2008); Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464
73 (lst Cir. 2006) (listing all cases rejecting constitutional challenges to NSEERS).
F.3d2665,
8
Rajah, 544 F.3d at 438 n.39.
269Id
270 id.

271 Id. at 438 (describing how the Second Circuit "agree[d] that a selective prosecution
based on an animus of that kind would call for some remedy," but then found no such animus
in the instant case).
2 72
Adam Serwer, The Supreme Court's Green Light to Discriminate, THE ATLANTIC
(June 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-supreme-courtsgreen-light-to-discriminate/563756/ [https://perma.cc/MQ2W-2NNQ].
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it becomes important to assess what benefits deference brings and what costs it
imposes.

D. The Costs and Benefits of PlenaryPower Deference
Deference in the immigration context has specific costs and benefits. It
grants the President flexibility to respond to international events, 273 but it also
promotes lazy, imprecise policies, including policies based on stereotypes rather
than evidence. 274 While defenders of plenary power deference regard these
policies as valuable "rough-hewn" measures, 275 others decry their harsh, often
unjust results. 2 76 Consider, now, the principal benefits and costs of deference to
the President's exclusion of noncitizens.
The most celebrated benefit of immigration deference is the flexibility it
grants the political branches to conduct foreign affairs and respond to
international developments. 27 7 Under the traditional understanding of plenary
power deference, the political branches may use immigration restrictions as
tools for conducting foreign affairs. 278 As noted above, Congress has delegated
exclusion power to the President, 27 9 and the President has used this power at
various points over the last several decades to impose a targeted suspension on
entry of people who had engaged in specific proscribed conduct. 2 80 Even outside
of the exclusion context, examples of "productive" executive deference abound.
President Carter used his authority under INA § 215 (8 U.S.C. § 1185) to recall
Iranian students during the hostage crisis at the American embassy in Tehran. 2 8 1
Under the circumstances, no matter how tenuous the link between recalling
Iranian students and pressuring the Iranians holding Americans as hostages, the
President's use of this authority was widely viewed as ajustified, useful "roughhewn" measure. 282 For reasons echoing the political question doctrine, courts
273

Martin, supra note 13, at 33.
See generally Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17 (2003) (noting a circuit split
and respondent's challenge to statutory framework mandating detention of certain
immigrants without bail); Taylor, supra note 23, at 361-63.
275
See Martin, supra note 13, at 47.
276
See Cleveland, supra note 22, at 14-15 (noting that the doctrine's origins "lie in a
peculiarly unattractive, late-nineteenth-century nationalist and racist view of American
society and federal power").
277 Martin, supra note 13, at 42.
278SId.
274

279

See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018).
280 Manuel, supra note 44, at 6-10 (listing the instances where presidents have exercised
the exclusion power pursuant to INA § 212(f) over the past several decades).
281 See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Manuel, supra note
44, at
11; Martin, supra note 13, at 42-43.
282
See Martin, supra note 13, at 42-44, 47 (discussing why immigration deference was
necessary in the Iranian hostage crisis and noting that "rough-hewn actions that initially seem
outsized or individually unfair might need to be in the mix to respond to, or to help shape,
actions that others are taking abroad").
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typically decline to disturb Congress's choice of exclusion and removal criteria
or the President's exercise of power delegated under the NA, and this allows
the political branches to use immigration restrictions as tools in conducting
2 83
foreign affairs.
Granting the President and Congress such latitude, however, comes at a
cost. It enables the political branches to promulgate inefficient policies based on
lazy thinking. In Demore v. Kim, for example, the Supreme Court recognized
Congress's substantial discretion to manage the removal of noncitizens. 284 The
question before the Court was the constitutionality of mandatory detention
without individualized bond hearings to consider the traditional criteria for civil
detention, namely, dangerousness and flight risk. 28 5 Instead of providing for the
hearings, Congress essentially presumed all removable noncitizens with certain
criminal convictions to be dangerous or flight risks. 2 86 Invoking the plenary
power doctrine, the Court upheld the mandatory detention statute as applied to
legal permanent residents, citing the latitude Congress enjoys in the immigration
context. 287 The Court explicitly stated that when it comes to immigrants,
Congress can legislate less precisely, thus tolerating inefficiency, waste, and
28 8
loosely-justified legislation.
The NSEERS special registration program, discussed above, also illustrates
the costs of executive discretion. The program targeted men from Arab and
2 83

See Narenji, 617 F.2d at 748 (finding that President's regulation requiring Iranian
students to report to the INS to review compliance with terms of their non-immigrant visas
was squarely within his judgment within the "field of foreign policy"). Given the President's
otherwise expansive authority in foreign affairs and associated expertise, the President is
entrusted to make sensitive calculations and judgment calls that balance a range of domestic
and foreign policy interests. Courts are not suited for this job. 1d; cf Louis Fisher, The Law:
PresidentialInherent Power: The "Sole Organ" Doctrine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139,
139-40 (2007) (noting that Chief Justice John Marshall had once referred to the President as
a "sole organ" for conducting foreign affairs, which the Supreme Court later invoked
erroneously to support a "plenary, exclusive, and inherent authority" of the President in
war as Commander-in-Chief).
waging
2 84
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
(1976)).
79-80
2 85
Id. at 527-28.
2 86
See id at 528.
2 87
1d at 521-22 ("In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
(quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976))).
citizens."
2 88
See id; Taylor, supra note 23, at 361-63. Another example of costly Executive
discretion is President Obama's decision to detain large numbers of Central American
migrant children to deter future child migrants. While this effort was lauded by some as an
appropriate measure to control migration pressure, see Martin, supra note 13, at 46, others
characterized it as a humanitarian crisis. See Johnathon Hiskey et al., Understandingthe
CentralAmerican Refugee Crisis: Why They Are Fleeingand How U.S. PoliciesAre Failing
to Deter Them, AM. 1MMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.americanimmigration
council.org/research/understanding-central-american-refugee-crisis [https://perma.cc/LG
K3-U8Z2].

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 80:1

predominantly Muslim countries, later adding North Korea as a "fig leaf." 289 It
focused on men based on the demographics of the 9/11 hijackers, thereby
implementing a national racial profiling policy. 2 90 This produced lasting harm
to families and communities. 29 1 For example, the program separated family
members from deported male relatives, often the primary income-earners, thus
subjecting the remaining family members to considerable hardship or even
homelessness. 29 2 Moreover, serious questions arose about the efficacy of the
program, as studies show it produced not a single terrorism-related conviction,
although the Bush Administration maintained that information about the
program was "classified" and that NSEERS had helped identify nearly a dozen
29
"terrorism suspects.1

3

Thus, deference to the President in immigration matters imposes costs as
well as benefits on society. When confronted with presidential animus, such as
that associated with President Trump's travel bans, 294 courts must consider how
to capture the benefits of deference-the legitimate functions of presidential
discretion in matters relating to foreign affairs-while minimizing the costs,
namely animus-laced policies doing serious injustice.

IV. THE IMPACT OF ANIMUS: EQUAL PROTECTION, RELIGION

CLAUSES,

AND VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION

Forbidden government intent encompasses racial and religious animus and
takes a variety of forms. 29 5 Courts routinely determine what effect direct
evidence of animus should have, but they rarely consider its effect when they
owe special deference to a decisionmaker expressing animus. This Part defines
"animus" and describes how courts analyze animus under the Equal Protection
Clause incorporated into the Fifth Amendment and the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. 29 6 It then considers the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion as
an analogy to plenary power deference. It focuses specifically on the claim of
vindictive prosecution, a claim based on due process that allows a criminal
defendant to seek dismissal of charges brought by a prosecutor due to animus.
Current jurisprudence shows that, once a criminal defendant proffers direct
evidence of animus, the prosecutor must then prove that animus was not

2 89

Wadhia, supra note 265, at 692. North Korea's function as a "fig leaf' continues, as
the Trump Administration added it to the list of banned countries in the third iteration of the
travel
ban. PENN STATE LAW RIGHTS WORKING GRP., supra note 95, at 37 n.5.
2 90
PENN STATE LAW RIGHTS WORKING GRP., supra note 95, at 6, 9.
291 Id. at 5-6.
292
Id. at 24.
293
294
295
296

Id. at 31.
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594-95 (4th Cir. 2017).
Fallon, supra note 115, at 554-58.
U.S. CONST. amends. I, V.
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necessary to the decision to bring charges. 297 In other words, the prosecutor
must prove that animus was not a "but-for" cause of the charges. Vindictive
prosecution offers a compelling analogy to claims of presidential animus in
immigration law because it contains two crucial elements: a deference or
discretion doctrine and direct evidence of animus. 29 8 On this analogy, even a
decisionmaker with tremendous discretion and authority is nonetheless
accountable for improper motive. By analogy to vindictive prosecution, courts
confronting claims of discriminatory exclusion due to presidential animus
should similarly adopt a mixed motives framework using a "but-for" motive
standard.
A. The Equal ProtectionBackdrop
Equal protection jurisprudence allows a court to invalidate a facially neutral
law if a forbidden government intent, such as racial animus, is a motivating
factor. 299 Although scholars have persuasively argued for refocusing judicial
attention toward substantive norms and away from lawmakers' subjective
motives or biases, 300 existing precedent allows courts to consider animus and
call lawmakers to account when it appears.
1. Defining "Animus"
Animus generally means "a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or
malevolent ill will.

' 30 1

The concept encompasses hostility, rivalry, opposition,

30 2

In the equal protection context, the Supreme Court has
and antipathy.
interpreted "animus" to mean a "desire to harm," the existence of private bias,
or fear based on stereotypes. 30 3 Animus may also appear as "expressing an
297 See, e.g., United States. v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2001).

298 Although the President's power to remove a noncitizen already here, rather than

excluding a noncitizen who has not yet effectuated an entry, is a stronger analogy to
vindictive prosecution, both prosecutorial discretion and plenary exclusion power are
associated with well-established deference doctrines. My purpose is to understand how
courts treat animus in the context of deference, and the vindictive prosecution analogy serves
this purpose.
299See generallyHunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,222 (1985) (holding that a facially
neutral provision in the Alabama constitution disenfranchised and discriminated against
blacks.
30
0 Fallon, supra note 115, at 529. But see Michael C. Dorf, Even a Dog: A Response to
ProfessorFallon, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 86,94 (Dec. 9,2016) (arguing for caution in adopting
Fallon's proposal due to "sweeping" effect of rejecting the doctrine of double effect on areas
such as criminal law, tort law, and anti-discrimination law).
30 1

Animus,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

(2018),

[https://perma.cc/N894-S3BS].
webster.com/dictionary/animus
302
1d.

303

Pollvogt, supra note 152, at 901-08.

https://www.merriam-
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ideology of white supremacy. '30 4 Professor William Araiza links the concept of
"animus" to the classic problem of factionalism, which manifested in the
nineteenth century as "class legislation," or legislation passed to achieve private
rather than public ends. 30 5 Professor Araiza has also persuasively linked animus
to subordination, understood as the burdening of a group without a "plausible
public-welfare justification. '30 6 The concept of dignity further clarifies the
meaning of animus, for a "common feature of the animus cases is that they
feature [a] denial of equal human status.

' 30 7

As for the effects of animus, its

presence is generally the only reason for which a law will fail rational basis
308
review.
Scholars have lamented the courts' failure to define animus, what
constitutes evidence of animus, and what impact a finding of animus will have
on a legal challenge. 30 9 The concept, in short, is radically "undertheorized." 3 10
The United States' history of race-based slavery, wartime detention, and
nativism makes racial animus a core concern of the federal courts, 3 11 but
research also suggests that animus can have a detrimental effect on social
function in the present day. 3 12 When a law embodies or implements animus, it
stands to impede social function. 3 13 Thus, while constitutional jurisprudence
does not clearly define animus and its effects, the concept remains important,
and a finding of animus can lead a court to invalidate a law.
2. The Impact ofAnimus on a FaciallyNeutral Law
Noncitizens within the United States are entitled to equal protection of the
laws, and evidence that government officials are applying a facially neutral law
in a racially discriminatory way may lead to its invalidation. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that a facially neutral municipal ordinance
304

1d. at 915-17 (discussing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967)).
See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANiMus: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAs IN THE LAW 1424 (2017).
306
See id.at 167.
3071d at 171.
308
See Pollvogt, supra note 152, at 889.
309
See Araiza, supra note 305, at 118-19 (discussing scholars' efforts to construe the
Court's animus jurisprudence).
30 5

310_d.at 74.
3 11

See Pollvogt, supra note 152, at 916 (discussing Loving v. Virginia and noting the
Court's emphasis on the antimiscegenation law's "origin in the institution of slavery and in
notions of racial integrity and nativism" (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967))).
3121 thank Richard Delgado for raising this point. See JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A
PSYCHOHISTORY 3-4 (1970).
3 13
See generally KOVEL, supra note 313, at 225 (discussing how racism, which "served
a stabilizing function in American culture for many generations," is now incompatible with
current ideals and with "advanced industrial life"); Pollvogt, supra note 152, at 907 (noting
that "laws based on animus... function to express and enforce private bias against a
particular social group, regardless of whether that bias itself is widely held or based in moral
or religious considerations.").
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regulating laundries in San Francisco violated equal protection because
administrators enforced the law in a manner that discriminated against Chinese
immigrants. 3 14 In that case, 200 Chinese immigrants had been denied licenses
to operate laundries, despite satisfying all relevant criteria, while eighty
similarly situated non-Chinese persons had successfully obtained laundry
licenses. 315 The city admitted that it denied the licenses based on race. The Court
held:
No reason for [the denial of licenses to Chinese applicants] is shown, and the
conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the
race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of
the law, is not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public
of the laws
administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection3 16
and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Yick Wo demonstrates noncitizens' entitlement to equal protection while
present in the United States, but it also demonstrates that animus can doom the
application of a facially neutral law when racial animus is the sole motive for
3 17
the challenged application.
Equal protection applies to immigrants within the United States, but equal
protection challenges to immigration laws are rarely successful. The federal
government's alienage classifications receive rational basis scrutiny, which
means the government wins if it has a merely rational basis for the
classification. 318 Similarly, the federal government has latitude to make
distinctions among noncitizens based on national origin, especially in
connection with admission and removal. 3 19 For example, when the Supreme
Court first articulated the plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan Ping,it declined
to review the explicitly racist Chinese Exclusion Act. 320 As noted earlier,
however, the Equal Protection Clause did not yet apply to the federal
government, and thus, there was no basis1 for subjecting any federal law to such
32
scrutiny, let alone an immigration law.

3 14

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
3151d. at 359; see also Charles J. McClain, IN SEARCH OF

EQUALITY:

THE CHINESE

STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

11617 (1994)

(describing laundry litigation).
3 16
yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
3 17
See Fallon, supra note 115, at 551. Yick Wo presents a rare case in which government
officials simply offered no legitimate purpose for the disparate enforcement of the challenged
law. 118 U.S. at 374.
3 18
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976).
3 19
See Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
320
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606-07
(1889).
321 See supra Part 1.
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Outside of immigration law, a line of cases provides for a robust "rational
basis" review where a law embodies animus toward an unpopular group. 322 In
cases like U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,3 23 City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center,32 4 Romer v. Evans,32 5 and UnitedStates v. Windsor,32 6
the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to invalidate laws or decisions
that exhibited "a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group. '32 7
These cases, too, involved laws passed or decisions taken due to purportedly
legitimate considerations; but evidence of animus gave the court latitude to
perform a more searching review to determine the real reason for the challenged
law or decision. 32 8 In these cases, the courts imposed an evidentiary burden on
defendants to prove their motives rather than merely resting on hypothesized
3 29
purposes.
Outside of these core "animus" cases, analysis of discriminatory intent 330 in
equal protection has spawned a variety of tests for invalidity. Initially, the Court

322 U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535, 538 (1973).
323Id. at 537-38 (holding that where Congress sought to preclude "hippies" living in
communes from accessing the food stamps program, a distinction between married and
unmarried households did not rationally further Congress's anti-fraud goal, but instead,
embodied animus against an unpopular group); see Araiza, supra note 305, at 29-30.
324 City of Clerbume v. Clerburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding that a
city violated equal protection by requiring that a proposed home for the intellectually
disabled obtain a special permit not required of other "multiple-dwelling facilities").
32 5
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that, where Colorado voters
amended the state constitution to preclude gay and lesbian persons from claiming protection
under anti-discrimination laws, the amendment had made gays and lesbians "a stranger to its
laws").
3 26
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 746 (2013) (finding that the Defense of
Marriage Act was motived by impermissible animus because its "principal effect [was] to
identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal").
327 See, e.g., id at 2693.
32 8 jd.; see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 142-43. A separate area of equal protection
jurisprudence suggests that the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on discrimination
against a "class-of-one" is not implicated in every case involving animus. However, the
animus in these cases resembles a personal vendetta and does not encompass racial or
religious animus. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,564 (2000), the Supreme
Court recognized so-called "class-of-one" equal protection claims, wherein individuals
could challenge irrational disparate treatment, not based on their identity as members of a
protected class, but simply as individuals. The Supreme Court held in Olech that a plaintiff
asserting a class-of-one claim need not prove animus. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Breyer noted that Olech had pleaded an "extra factor," which the appeals court had termed
"vindictive action" or "illegitimate animus." Id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring). In
Engquist v. Oregon DepartmentofAgriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 609 (2008), the Court clarified
that animus is not only unnecessary, but also insufficient. See William D. Araiza, Flunking
the Class-of-One/FailingEqual Protection,55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435, 466-67 (2013).
32 9
See ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 125.
3301 am not suggesting that "discriminatory intent" is synonymous with "animus," but
that the doctrinal framework for analyzing discriminatory intent is ultimately useful for
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established a "but-for" test for racial discrimination cases. In Village of
Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp., the Court ruled

that a plaintiff could prevail on an equal protection claim by proving that racial
animus was a "but-for" cause of the challenged decision. 3 31 In that case,
plaintiffs petitioned to rezone a tract of land in the Village of Arlington Heights
332
to build affordable housing, which black families primarily would inhabit.
After a series of public meetings, where at least some members of the public
espoused concern about black families moving in, the Village Plan Commission
("Village") denied the petition to rezone, and plaintiffs sued, arguing that the
Village denied the petition to prevent black families from moving into the area
in question. 333 The district court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed
in part. On review, the Supreme Court determined that an improper motive alone
would not invalidate a decision or law.33 4 Instead, in a case of mixed motives,
the plaintiffs would have to show that the same decision would not have been
made but-for the racially discriminatory purpose. 335 Lacking direct evidence of
Village officials' racial animus, plaintiffs could not overcome the Village's
petition, namely that the area had
race-neutral reason for denying the rezoning336
homes.
family
single
always been zoned for
The Supreme Court has also suggested that an improper racially
discriminatory purpose automatically taints a facially neutral law. 33 7 In Hunter
v. Underwood, the Supreme Court invalidated Article VIH, § 182 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901, which excluded persons convicted of crimes
involving "moral turpitude" from voting in state elections. 33 8 The record
revealed that delegates to Alabama's Constitutional Convention of 1901
convened for the purpose of establishing "'white supremacy" 'within the limits

analyzing "animus." See Araiza, supranote 305, at 130-31 (describing discriminatory intent
as analogous to animus).

331 Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21
(1977); Fallon, supra note 115, at 555-56 (describing "but-for" standard articulated in

Arlington Heights).
332Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. at 257.

3331d. at 257-59.
3341d. at 270-71 n.21.
335Id. Professor Richard Fallon has argued that this "misunderstands the relevant
constitutional question." Fallon, supra note 115, at 579. Rather than inquiring whether the
same law would have been passed regardless of forbidden motive, the question is "whether
a court should defer to the legislature's judgment that a challenged statute comports with
constitutional norms." Id.His conclusion that a breach of deliberative obligations should end
deference appears to support the lower courts' suspension of plenary power deference upon
a showing of animus, but it does not grapple with the special case of executive deference in
immigration law.
336Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270.
33 7

See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1985); Verstein, supra note 36, at

1144.
338471 U.S. at 223.
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imposed by the Federal Constitution."' '3 39 In litigation, however, the state
argued that the purpose of the challenged provision "was to prevent the
resurgence of Populism by disenfranchising practically all of the blacks and a
large number of [poor] whites. '3 40 The Court relied heavily on the Court of
Appeals' determination that "there could be no finding that there was a
competing permissible intent for the enactment of § 182." 3 4 1 As Professor
Andrew Verstein has explained, rather than remanding to the trial court to
determine the relative strengths of the two stated purposes, i.e., whether the
desire to reduce the black voting population was truly a "but-for" motive for the
provision, the Supreme Court concluded that the permissible purpose of
disenfranchising poor whites "would not render nugatory" the improper purpose
of discriminating against blacks. 342 Thus, the Supreme Court purported to apply
a "but-for" test but actually appeared to find the racist taint of anti-black
34 3
discrimination insurmountable.
When the government invokes national security, however, the Court has
taken a different approach. Korematsu v. United States offers insight into the
dilemma of judges evaluating racially discriminatory laws peddled on national
security grounds. In that case, the petitioner, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu,
sought to vacate his conviction for violating a civilian exclusion order that
applied during World War II only to individuals of Japanese ancestry, including
American citizens such as petitioner himself.344 The majority noted that facially
discriminatory laws, such as the executive orders at issue, were subject to "the
most rigid scrutiny," in keeping with equal protection jurisprudence. 34 5
Nonetheless, the majority upheld petitioner's conviction and the underlying
orders on account of "the real military dangers which were presented. '34 6 In
their view, national security concerns--even if formulated vaguely as racebased suspicion of disloyalty-justified a facially discriminatory internment
law.
In dissent, Justice Murphy described military discretion as broad, but not
unlimited, and noted that laws based on pleas of military necessity can only be
justified on the grounds of "a public danger that is so 'immediate, imminent,
and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of
ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger. '34 7 In the instant case,
339Id.at 229 (quoting I Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the
State of Alabama, May 21st, 1901 to Sept. 3rd, 1901, at 8 (1940)).
340 d.at 230 (quoting Cross-Examination of Dr. J. Mills Thornton, 4 Record 73-74, 80-

81).
341 Id.at 225.
342
See Verstein, supranote 36, at 1144; Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232.
343 See Verstein, supranote 36, at 1144.
344Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), overruled by Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
345 Id.

346Id.at 223.
3471d.at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Murphy decried the government's reliance on "questionable racial and
sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military
judgment," such as claims that those individuals of Japanese ancestry performed
"emperor-worship ceremonies" and the existence of Japanese language schools
suggested "group disloyalty. '34 8 Further, the government's failure to provide
individualized investigations and hearings on loyalty-procedures used for
people of German or Italian descent-underscored the impermissible racial
discrimination motivating the exclusion orders. 34 9 In his famous dissent, Justice
Jackson acknowledged the judiciary's limited competence to review military
decisions, which are often based on secret evidence and unproven
assumptions. 3 50 He noted that courts often have access only to reports of
questionable credibility and "unsworn, self-serving" statements by military
officials. 3 51 Thus, courts must necessarily accept "the mere declaration of the
authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military
viewpoint. '3 52 By reviewing and approving of the contested orders, however,
the Court risks transforming a "passing incident" into "the doctrine of the
Constitution." 3 53 Although the majority appeared to regard Korematsu as a
mixed motives case, where both racial prejudice and national security played a
role, the dissent saw it as a "sole motive" case, one in which individuals of
354
In its travel
Japanese ancestry were interned "solely" because of their race.
overruled"
"was
Korematsu
that
announced
Court
ban decision, the Supreme
there,
at
issue
orders
the
but failed to admit that the government had justified
355
grounds.
security
too, on national

B. Religious Discrimination
The First Amendment's religion clauses also support invalidation of laws
motivated by animus toward an unpopular religious group, and the Supreme
Court in this setting appears to use the "any" motive standard rather than the
"but-for" motive standard. 3 56 In relevant part, the First Amendment states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
34 8
3 49

3 50

1d. at 236-37.
1d. at 241.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

3511Id

3521d
353 Id.at 246.

354Id. at 226 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
3 55
See Joseph Fishkin, Why Was Korematsu Wrong?, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2018),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-was-korematsu-wrong.html
[https://perma-cc/92VU-K3VK]; see also Anil Kalhan, Trump v. Hawaii and ChiefJustice
Roberts's "Korematsu Overruled" Parlor Trick, ACS BLOG (June 29, 2018),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/trump-v-hawaii-and-chief-justice-roberts' s-"korematsuoverruled"-parlor-trick [https://perma.cc/39V4-PT24].
356 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993).
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'357 In Church ofLukumi BabaluAye, Inc.
v. City ofHialeah,the Supreme Court considered the validity of a city ordinance
that banned the ritual slaughter of animals. 3 58 Members of a church practicing
the Santeria faith, for which animal sacrifice is a central practice, challenged the
ordinance as a violation of the First Amendment. 3 59 The Court found the
ordinances facially neutral, references to "ritual" notwithstanding, but it
determined that the purpose and effect of the law was to suppress "the central
element of the Santeria worship service. '360 Drawing on equal protection
jurisprudence, the Court determined that the city had adopted the challenged
ordinances "because of' rather than "in spite of" of the impact on Santeria
religious practice. 3 6 1 In particular, the Court found the record to reveal abundant
evidence of lawmakers' hostility to Santeria. 362 In contrast, compliance with the
Free Exercise Clause requires lawmakers to ensure that their "sole reasons for
imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular. '3 63 As a result, the Court
invalidated the ordinance and appeared to use the rigorous "any" motive
standard to police laws burdening religious practice. 364
Analysis of Establishment Clause claims similarly turns on a purpose
inquiry. 36 5 In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Supreme Court
affirmed a preliminary injunction against a Ten Commandments display in
various county courthouses in Kentucky. 366 The Court reaffirmed the centrality
of the purpose inquiry and determined that secular purposes articulated as
litigation positions could not negate an apparent predominantly religious
purpose. 367 Holding that the Establishment Clause demands "governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion," 36 8 the Court ruled that support was "ample" for the district court's
finding that the Ten Commandments display had a predominantly religious
purpose, post-hoc secular explanations notwithstanding. 3 69 Ultimately, the
religious discrimination jurisprudence stands out for the central role of objective
purpose in determining the validity of official acts. Church of Lukumi also
suggests that lawmakers' animus toward an unpopular religion may contribute

357 U.S. CONST.

amend. I.
358 Church ofLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 524, 526.
359Id. at 523-25.
3601d.at 534.
361 Id. at 540-41.
3621d.at 541.

363 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 547.
3 64
1d. at 546.
3 65
McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
366545 U.S. at 881.
3671d. at 871.
368Id. at 860.
3691d. at 881.
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to a court's decision to invalidate a facially neutral law. 37 0 Although the Court's
language varies, and setting aside potentially important distinctions between
"purpose" and "motive," 3 7 1 it appears that the Court uses a motive standard
intolerant of any quantum of animus. 3 72 However, this jurisprudence does not
offer guidance regarding the effect of plenary power deference on the analysis
373
of animus.
C. Animus and ProsecutorialDiscretion:Vindictive Prosecution
Mainstream constitutional law offers some guidance on the impact of
animus on a facially neutral law, but it does not address the impact of a deference
doctrine like immigration's plenary power. Analogies are hard to find because
so rarely are officials granted as much discretion as the President in exercising
his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). A useful analogy, however,
appears in the context of criminal prosecution. Similar to the President
identifying classes of noncitizens for exclusion, prosecutors have broad latitude
to bring charges. 374 Courts seldom interfere in those decisions, instead giving
deference to executive judgments in both settings. 37 5 Nonetheless, the presence
of animus triggers a role for the courts in both settings. Specifically, in criminal
law, the doctrine known as "vindictive prosecution" 3 76 provides a cause of
3 70

See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes
Inspired by the Problem of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 30
(1993) (arguing that "[w]hat made the city's action [in Babalu Aye] violate the First
Amendment was that it in fact targeted, and punished, only those animal sacrifices which
were religious in character," not merely that the city "set out" to do so). This confirms
doctrine holding that, discriminatory purpose alone, without discriminatory effects, is not
actionable in such a case.
371 See Fallon, supranote 115, at 531.
3 72
The Court reaffirmed this intolerance for government officials' disparagement of an
individual's religious beliefs s in its recent decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) (cataloguing commission's "hostility" toward
baker Jack Phillips' "sincere religious beliefs").
373 Scholars and jurists have observed that the Establishment Clause is typically applied
in cases dealing directly with religious beliefs or practices, or with conduct supporting
religious institutions, and they have questioned the propriety of extending the Establishment
Clause to the different context of the travel ban. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418
(2018) (discussing how the application of the Establishment Clause here is different from
the "conventional" Establishment Clause case). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court considered
the Establishment Clause but selected a motive standard much more tolerant of animus. I
thank Peter Margulies for raising this point.
3 74
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
375 See, e.g., id.
3 76
See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 377 (1982) (describing Court's
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when "action detrimental to the defendant has
been taken after the exercise of a legal right"). For an example of alleged vindictive
prosecution with an immigration nexus, see Paul Elias, GarciaZarate Gets Time Servedfor
Gun Charge in Kate Steinle Shooting Death Case, NBC BAY AREA (Jan. 5, 2018),
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action for individuals prosecuted out of animus. Although the analogy of
vindictive prosecution to plenary power in exclusion is weaker than the analogy
to the President's discretion in the realm of removal, 37 7 the analogy remains
useful because vindictive prosecution includes both a highly discretionary
decision (whether to bring charges), one typically entitled to deference, and
3 78
allegations of animus.

When probable cause supports charges against a defendant, a prosecutor
enjoys broad discretion to bring charges. 3 79 This is the essence of prosecutorial
discretion. Prosecutors consider factors such as "resource limitations, law
enforcement priorities, needs or wishes of the victim, and the perceived public
interest" when deciding whether to bring charges. 380 Prosecutorial discretion
intends to promote efficiency and other values. 3 8 1 Accordingly, a defendant
typically has no right to challenge an indictment otherwise based on probable

https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Jose-Ines-Garcia-Zarate-Sentencing-Kate-Steinle2015-Fatal-Shooting-San-Francisco-Pier-468127093.html [https://perma.cc/G3LM-F9XQ].
Kate Steinle, a San Francisco woman, was killed when Jose Ines Garcia Zarate fired a gun
he found by the pier, and the bullet ricocheted and struck her. President Trump focused on
Zarate's status as a five-time-deported undocumented immigrant to bolster support for a wall
between Mexico and the U.S. After ajury acquitted Zarate of murder in state court, the U.S.
Attorney sought to bring gun charges on Zarate involving the same offense. Zarate's attorney
decried the prosecution as a violation of double jeopardy and a politically-motivated
"vindictive prosecution." Id
3 77
See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 464. I thank Fatma Marouf for raising this
point.
378 Defendants usually have greater success in bringing vindictive prosecution claims
post-trial, challenging, for example, a prosecutor's decision to try a defendant on new
charges that were available during the defendant's first unsuccessful trial. See United States
v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 319 (4th Cir. 2001). Structural racism permeates all levels of the
criminal justice system, and one might wonder whether a cause of action originating in
criminal law can offer a meaningful check on animus. See Radley Balko, There's
Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal-justiceSystem Is Racist. Here's the Proof
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/
09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-theproof/?utm term=.aa6aac7l325d [https://perma.cc/PT9M-UKMR]. The search for a
compelling analogy, however, is no guarantee of finding an appropriate remedy for the
problem of racial and religious animus. Rather, the hope is to better understand what courts
already do in similar cases. If courts do not remedy discrimination where decisionmakers are
owed deference in, say, criminal law, that suggests that the courts are unlikely to provide
relief in an exclusion setting.
3 79
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
380 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., ProsecutorialNullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1244
(2011).
3811Id

PLENARY POWER AND ANIMUS IN IMAlGRA TION LA W

2019]

cause. 382 Prosecutors,
regularity.

'383

like the

Executive,

enjoy

a

"presumption

of

Prosecutorial discretion has limits, however, and "[t]he Constitution
prohibits the government from undertaking a prosecution based solely on a
vindictive motive." 3 84 Defendants can seek dismissal of charges against them
upon proffering "clear evidence" of prosecutorial animus to overcome the
presumption of regularity. 385 Criminal defendants asserting vindictive
prosecution claims at the pretrial stage must come forward with objective
386
evidence of prosecutorial animus rather than inferences based on speculation.
They typically must possess "smoking gun" 387 evidence of a prosecutor's
animus, such as the prosecutor's public or private statements or documents
evincing the government's improper motive. 3 88 Once the plaintiff does so, the
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate a legitimate purpose for the
animus toward the defendant was
prosecution, specifically that the prosecutor's
3 89
prosecution.
the
of
cause
not a "but-for"
The federal appeals courts that have considered vindictive prosecution
390
claims tend to equate "but-for" cause with "sole motive." In United States v.
Jarrett,the Seventh Circuit explained that a criminal defendant can succeed on
3 82

See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-65 ("In the ordinary case, 'so long as the prosecutor
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion."' (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
(1978))).
364 38
3

Id.

384 United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,380 n.12 (1982) (noting that lack of a presumption of vindictiveness
does not "foreclose the possibility that a defendant might prove through objective evidence
an improper prosecutorial motive," and specifically, that prosecutor's conduct was "solely
to 'penalize' the defendant and could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial
discretion").
3 85
Jarrett,447 F.3d at 524-25 (interpreting "prosecutorial animus" to mean "a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an attempt to seek self-vindication").
3861d. at 525.
3 87

1d. at 527.

3 88

1d. (finding it significant that defendant seeking dismissal of charges failed to
"produced any public or private statement by a prosecutor manifesting animus toward him;
any document that might establish bad motives on the part of the government; or any similar
'smoking gun"').
3 89
1d. at 525 (noting that once defendant proffers objective evidence of the prosecutor's
vindictive motive, "[a] court must be persuaded that the defendant would not have been
but for the government's animus or desire to penalize him").
prosecuted
390
See id at 524; United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001); Verstein,
supra note 36, at 1161 & tbl.1. Constitutional law scholars have also tended to equate the
two standards. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 119 (1971) (discussing proof

that illicit motive was "sole" or "dominant" motive as tantamount to proving that, "but for
the decisionmaker's desire to promote an illicit objective, the decision would not have been
made").
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a vindictive prosecution claim only upon proving that, but for the animus, the
criminal defendant would not have been prosecuted. 3 9 1 However, the court
characterized the defendant's claim as asserting that the prosecutor's "sole
purpose" in charging him was to remove him as counsel for another party. 39 2
Similarly, in United States v. Wilson, the Fourth Circuit explained that
establishing prosecutorial vindictiveness requires showing that "(1) the
prosecutor acted with genuine animus toward the defendant and (2) the
defendant would not have been prosecuted but for that animus. ' ' 393 In the same
citation, however, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Goodwin for
the proposition that "'charges must be brought 'solely to penalize' the defendant
and could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion."' 3 94
Thus, judges speak imprecisely about whether a criminal defendant must prove
animus is the sole motive for the prosecution or a but-for motive. 395 As it turns
out, the distinction matters, for the sole motive standard operates to "give
the ... case to the defendant. '39 6 If animus matters at all to the resolution of
these claims, the sole motive standard must be rejected, and such a rejection is
consistent with the vindictive prosecution cases described above.
Ultimately, criminal defendants have a right under equal protection and due
process not to be prosecuted based on their protected characteristics or merely
due to prosecutorial animus, even if the defendant is properly charged
otherwise. 3 97 Despite prosecutors' substantial discretion, "smoking gun"

391 447 F.3d at 528.
392Id.at 530.
393 262 F.3d at 314. In Wilson, the court discussed the availability of a presumption of
vindictiveness absent direct evidence. It suggested that such a presumption would be
warranted where a prosecutor initially decided not to try the defendant "on an additional
available charge" but later did so "after the defendant's successful appeal." Id. at 319. In
such a case, courts could draw an inference that "the only material fact different the second
time around-the defendant's successful appeal of his original conviction," prompted the
second prosecution. Id. On this view, a defendant can receive a presumption of
vindictiveness where the only possible motive is vindictiveness. Id.
394 Id. at 314 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.12 (1982).
39 5
See Jarrett,447 F.3d at 524; see also Verstein, supra note 36, at 1161; cf Hartman
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262-63 (2006) (rejecting defendant's Bivens claim against a
prosecutor based on a postal inspector's animus toward defendant, which subsequently
caused the prosecutor to bring charges, where probable cause supported the charges
regardless).
39 6
See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1140.
397 Selective prosecution claims are closely related claims arising out of the requirement
of equal protection. Prevailing on a selective prosecution claim requires proof of
discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464-66 (1996). The Supreme Court has suggested that plaintiffs asserting these claims
typically possess evidence of discriminatory impact but lack evidence of the prosecutor's
discriminatory intent in prosecuting them. Accordingly, these plaintiffs must produce
evidence of discriminatory effect to obtain discovery to prove the prosecutor's
discriminatory intent. Id. at 464.
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animus triggers a process for sorting through the prosecutor's motives,
3 98
potentially involving a burden-shifting framework.
D. Trump v. Hawaii in the Supreme Court
This discussion regarding the correct analytic approach must contend with
the Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of the travel ban litigation. As noted
above, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision affirming the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs unlikely to prevail
on their statutory or constitutional claims. 399 As to the constitutional claim, the
Court determined that plaintiffs had standing, and their Establishment Clause
claim was justiciable because plaintiffs faced a concrete hardship of being
40 0
The Court then
separated from family members due to the travel ban.
considered the merits, concluding that the case before it differed substantially
401
because of the political
from "the conventional Establishment Clause case"
for admission of
criteria
the
establishing
in
branches' broad latitude
40 2
but that the
applied,
The Court determined that Mandel
noncitizens.
government had accepted a more searching analysis. It then decided that it could
consider the President's statements of anti-Muslim animus, but only to the
extent consistent with "rational basis review," 40 3 which the Court took to require
no more than a plausible relationship between the exclusion order and the
40 4
Ultimately, the Court
government's stated national security objective.
of animus, but
statements
acknowledged its authority to consider the President's
then did nothing with them. The statements had no effect on the analysis, let
not the "sole"
alone the outcome, because the Court determined that animus was
40 5
motive behind the exclusion order.
Responding to Justice Sotoymayor's dissent, the Court denied Korematsu's
relevance to the analysis of the travel ban, even though the President himself
likened the initial travel ban to President Roosevelt's internment of Americans
of Japanese descent during World War 11.406 The Court specifically
characterized Korematsuas "morally repugnant," involving an internment order

3 98

See Jarrett,447 F.3d at 525, 527.

399 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
400Id. at 2416.
401/d. at 2418.
4 02

4 03

Id. at 2418-19.

Id. at 2420.
404Id. at 2421-23.
4 05
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018).
406 While on the campaign trail, Trump likened his proposed "Muslim ban" to President
Roosevelt's internment of people of Japanese ancestry during World War II. Adam Liptak,
Travel Ban Is Shadowed by One of Supreme Court's Darkest Moments, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/us/politics/travel-ban-japanese-internment

-trump-supreme-court.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]; see Fishkin, supra note
355.
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"solely and explicitly on the basis of race. '40 7 As even the majority opinion in
Korematsu makes clear,4 0 8 however, that case has never been considered one in
which the government offered nojustificationapartfrom animus.409 Indeed, the
government in that case argued that national security justified the civilian
exclusion order, and the Korematsu majority invoked that very justification in
upholding Fred Korematsu's conviction. 4 10
Apart from its suspect discussion of Korematsu, the Court in Trump v.
Hawaii unconvincingly distinguished the animus cases from the instant case.4 11
The Court characterized the animus cases as ones involving a single motiveanimus-and no legitimate justifications. However, as scholars have noted, in
each of those cases, government officials defended the challenged actions by
invoking some legitimate public purpose. 4 12 In Moreno, the claimed legitimate
purpose was limiting the potential for abuse; 4 13 in Cleburne, it was concerns
about traffic and overcrowding; 4 14 and in Romer, it was denying "homosexuals
special rights." 4 15 Nonetheless, because of the discernible presence of animus in
each case, either from legislative history, 4 16 zoning commission hearings, 4 17 or
from the text of the enactment itself,4 18 the Court refused to accept defendants'

407 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
40 8
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), overruledby id.
409 See Fishkin, supra note 355; see also Anil Kalhan, Trump v. Hawaiiand ChiefJustice
Roberts's "Korematsu Overruled" Parlor Trick, ACS BLoG (June 29, 2018),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/tnunp-v-hawaii-and-chief-justice-roberts' s-"korematsuoverruled"-parlor-trick [https://perma.cc/39V4-PT241 (discussing how the Court in
Korematsu did not "grapple with the underlying racism of a policy that purports to rests on
grounds other than racial discrimination").
4 10
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
4 11
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420-21.
4 12
See ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 32, 38, 55.
413 United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 534, 535 (stating "the Government
maintains that the challenged classification should nevertheless be upheld as rationally
related to the clearly legitimate governmental interest in minimizing fraud in the
administration of the food stamp program."); see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 32.
414 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 436-38, 438 & n.7 (1985)
(describing the city's concern that the Cleburne Living Center (CLC) group home would be
overcrowded with thirteen residents rather than the state regulation's maximum of six
residents); see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 38.
4 15
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,626, 638 (1996) (discussing the Colorado amendment
that prohibits "special treatment of homosexuals"); see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 55.
4 16 See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535 ("The legislative history that does exist, however,
indicates that that amendment was intended to prevent so called 'hippies' and 'hippie
communes' from participating in the food stamp program."); see also ARAIZA, supra note
305,4 at 31.
17
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37, n.4, 465, n.17 (describing the City of
Cleburne's historical precedent of discriminating against intellectually disabled individuals
through city ordinances); ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 38.
4 18
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 55-56.
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post-hoc rationalizations. 4 19 Instead, the presence of direct evidence of animus

420
led the Court to apply a more searching rational basis review. Rather than
requiring plaintiffs to prove that official action was undertaken solely based on
42
animus, the animus cases contemplated mixed motives as well. ' The Court's
failure to acknowledge this will likely produce confusion in the lower courts,
and the need for a proper analytic approach has only grown since the Court's
initial assessment of plaintiffs' claims.

V. A PATH FORWARD: A ROLE FOR THE COURTS
Courts that have analyzed the effect of President Trump's anti-Muslim
statements on the validity of his travel bans have taken one of two views: full,
continued deference, provided the President supplies even one legitimate reason
423
The above
for the challenged policy 4 22 or, alternatively, no deference at all.

discussion, however, reveals a third way that offers greater clarity and promise:
a mixed motives analysis that parses the relative contributions of animus and
potentially legitimate motives behind an exclusion law. Consider how such a
framework might apply to the Trump travel bans on remand in the lower courts
and the most likely objections to this application.
A. Applying a Mixed Motives Frameworkto the Travel Bans
This Article contends that the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard
of review applicable to exclusion decisions under Kleindienstv. Mandel should
also apply to exclusion laws such as the travel bans. 42 4 Although some judges
contend that the greatest possible deference must be shown to the political
branches' discretionary choice of criteria for admission and removal, the
Supreme Court has indicated that courts retain the authority to review exclusion
4 19

See ARAIZA, supranote 305, at 119; Steve Sanders, Making-It Up: Lessons for Equal
ProtectionDoctrine from the Use and Abuse of Hypothesized Purposes in the Marriage
Equality Litigation, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 700 (2017) (noting the Court's failure to credit
rationalizations in the animus cases).
post-hoc
4 20
See ARAIzA, supra note 305, at 119.
421See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 765, 798-99 (2013); Brief of
Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 25, Trump v. Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (No. 16-1436); Cristina M. Rodriguez,
Trump v. Hawaii and the Future of PresidentialPower over Immigration, 2017-18 ACS
SuP. CT. REV. 161, 187-88 (2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/
ACS-Supreme-Court-Review-2018-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4WC-42YZ].
4 22
See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting
denial of reconsideration en banc).
from4 23
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 592 (4th Cir. 2017),
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). As noted, however, the Supreme Court
the "sole" motive standard applied but did not decide the question.
assumed
4 24
See supra Part II; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (stating that
Mandel applies to an exclusion order).
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laws for at least some minimal factual basis. 42 5 Moreover, the government's
failure to assert the power to explicitly discriminate based on race or religion,
the strongest form of plenary power authority, strengthens the case for judicial
review. 42 6 At oral argument, the Solicitor General conceded that even a facially
neutral exclusion order would be unconstitutional under Mandel if the President
ordered the Cabinet to "keep out a particular race or a particular religion, no
matter what. '42 7 Thus, only a milder version of plenary power is at issue: the
power to enact a facially neutral exclusion law in part with a discriminatory
purpose, i.e., with the partial objective of barring admission of an unpopular
group defined by race or religion due to an irrational fear or hatred of that
group. 42 8 It is this combination-facial neutrality and some degree of lawmaker
animus-that this Article addresses.
Even though the Supreme Court agreed with many lower court judges that
Mandel applies to the travel bans, judges disagree about the permissibility of
considering "extrinsic evidence" of a law's purpose, such as the President's
speeches and tweets, under Mandel.429 Several judges on the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits have argued that Mandel does not permit consideration of extrinsic
evidence because "facially legitimate" means courts may look only to the face
of the exclusion law and "bona fide" does not permit "looking behind" the
Executive's stated reasons. 43 0 This interpretation is baffling, as it eliminates the
requirement that the reason be "bona fide." If a requirement that a reason be
"bona fide" does not authorize a court to review public statements constituting
425

Cf Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590 (1952) (noting that the court could
not "declare that congressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power.., is either a
fantasy or a pretense," and that "no responsible American would say that there... are now
no possible grounds on which Congress might believe that Communists in our midst are
inimical to our security"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
4 26
Margo Schlanger, Symposium: Could This Be the End of Plenary Power?,
SCOTUSblog (July 14, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-endplenary-power/ [https://perma.cc/N5NN-L4SQ] (referring to this argument as the "dog that
is not barking in the night"); see also Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d
233, 322 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wynn, J., concurring) (noting that neither the government nor the
dissenting Justices defended the President's power to invidiously discriminate based on a
protected
classification, such as race, sex, or religion).
42 7
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)
(No.4217-965).
8
Cf Neuman, supra note 74 (arguing that EO-1 was not facially neutral because it
refers to "honor killings" and preference for Christian refugees). Thus, an even milder form
of plenary power remains--the power to issue facially neutral order, but with animus as one
of at least two motives.
429 Compare Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591-92, 594
(finding it permissible to consider the President's extrinsic statements) vacated as moot, 138
S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.), with id.
at 652 (Niemeyer, J.,
dissenting) (finding it impermissible
to consider
the
President's
extrinsic
statements).
43 0
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 648 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting);
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the
denial of reconsideration en banc).
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direct evidence of improper motive, how else would a plaintiff ever be able to
show a "facially legitimate" reason was not bona fide? 4 3 1 If courts lack even this
power, then the standard is better understood as "facially legitimate," full stop.
Judges reluctant to "look behind" stated reasons for Executive policy
correctly observe that the search for a "bona fide" reason would not authorize
courts to grant plaintiffs' discovery to establish an executive's improper
purpose. 4 32 However, when the Executive himself places his allegedly improper
motive into public discourse, 4 33 the plaintiffs are not then seeking the court's
434 In such
assistance in prying into the Executive's private deliberations.
circumstances, Mandel's concern for taking the Executive's stated reasons at
the
face value does not apply.4 35 Thus, courts can and should consider
436
President's speeches and tweets in cases such as the travel ban litigation.
Finally, the typical wariness about invalidating laws, especially ones
entitled to deference, based solely on improper motive springs from a fear or
suspicion that the court would be participating in a "charade." 43 7 On this view,
invalidating an executive order would be futile if the President could promulgate

43 1

Notably, the Solicitor General conceded in the argument before the Supreme Court
that a President's extrinsic statements to Cabinet officials after taking the oath of office could
undermine the facial legitimacy of his stated reason for an entry ban under Mandel. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
432 See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 648 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). But
cf Aziz Z. Huq, What Is DiscriminatoryIntent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2018)
(cataloguing "evidentiary instruments available for identifying impermissible motives,"
including civil discovery).
433 See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594.
43
4Cf United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (denying plaintiffs'
discovery as to discriminatory intent absent a showing of discriminatory impact); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that the court will not "look behind"
Executive's stated reason when it is both "facially legitimate and bona fide"). For a defense
of judges considering extrinsic evidence of purpose in Korematsu and the travel ban cases,
see Ian Samuel & Leah Litman, No Peeking? Korematsu andJudicialCredulity, TAKE CARE
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/no-peeking-korematsu-and-judicialcredulity [https://perma.cc/K32P-92J3].
435 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. Moreover, recent criticisms of efforts to ascribe a
unitary intent or purpose to a multi-member body, like Congress, have less force when
considering the intent or purpose of a single individual: the President. Katherine Shaw,
Beyond the Bully Pulpit:PresidentialSpeech in the Courts, 96 TEx. L. REV. 71, 139 (2017).
436 Shaw, supra note 435, at 139. But cf Jacob T. Levy, The Weight of the Words,
NiSKANEN CTR. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-weight-of-the-words/
[https://perma.cc/2GTW-C793] (arguing that President Trump's political speech is a form
of political action, one that has the power to "undermine the existence of shared belief in
truth and facts," and should not be ignored); see also Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and
the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that presidential intent is
properly considered for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of an executive order, as
illustrated by the travel ban litigation).
437 John Hart Ely, Legislative andAdministrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1214 (1970).
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the same executive order, but this time, stay off Twitter. 4 38 The wrinkle in the
instant case, however, is that the President is trading on animus. Far from
inadvertently disclosing his private thoughts, he purposely shares his prejudices
to appeal to his base, to reassure them of his racism, especially at moments when
he might be perceived as showing generosity toward sympathetic noncitizens,
such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) recipients, or making
deals with political adversaries. 4 39 For this reason, the danger of enmeshing the
courts in a "charade" is especially low. 440 Thus, courts should consider the
President's speech as direct evidence of animus.
For judges who accept this proposition, however, a further question
remains: what motive standard should apply? In the lower courts, judges
vacillated between the "sole motive" and "any motive" standard, 44 1 and in the
Supreme Court, the majority selected "sole motive," and two of the dissenters
applied the "primary motive" standard. 4 42 In so doing, all of these judges
overlooked the remaining option: "but-for" motive. 443 Cases like Church of
Lukumi and McCreary County suggest that either the "any motive" or "primary
motive" standards typically apply to religious discrimination cases. Under
Church of Lukumi, the presence of any improper motive invalidates a law
because it means that the law was not passed with purely innocent motives. 444
Similarly, under McCreary, a law fails Establishment Clause scrutiny if it does
not have a "predominantly" secular purpose. 44 5 This does not mean a
government enactment cannot have a religious purpose, but, simply, that it must
also have a stronger, independently sufficient secular purpose to be valid.44 6

43 8
See
439

id.
See Taegan Goddard, Trump Bragged to Friends About 'Shithole' Remark, POL.
WiRE (Jan. 14, 2018), https://politicalwire.com/2018/01/14/trump-bragged-fiends-shitholeremark/ [https://perma.cc/R3CG-V82V].
440See Ely, supra note 437, at 1214. But see Brest, supra note 390, at 139 (arguing for
judicial
review of motivation even in discretionary choices).
44 1
See supra Part II.
442 Compare Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420-21 (2018) (analyzing whether the
exclusion order was "'inexplicable by anything but animus"'), with id. at 2438 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (using the "primary purpose" test under Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
443

See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1161 (listing four widespread motive standards). But
see Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed Motives Jurisprudence,86 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (arguing that all other motive standards are superior to the "but-for"
standard).
444508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
445
McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
446

See Verstein, supranote 36, at 1134 (discussing "primary motive" as a more plaintifffriendly standard, requiring only that the impermissible motive exceed the permissible one,
even if both are independently sufficient to motivate the contested enactment).
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These standards, perhaps reflecting the Framers' special concern for
religious freedom, 44 7 demand a great deal from the government. Plenary power
deference in immigration law does not. 4 48 As a result, courts must consider
whether a more deferential motive standard should apply to religious
discrimination challenges to immigration law. Based on a careful review of
equal protection jurisprudence and the analogy to prosecutorial discretion, this
Article contends that the "but-for" motive standard provides a compelling,
449
sensible alternative.
The analogy between prosecutorial discretion and Executive discretion in
immigration law helps explain the appeal of this approach. Just like a prosecutor
deciding whether to bring charges against a potential defendant or set policy for
their department, the President has broad discretion to suspend the entry of
certain noncitizens and to develop a policy articulating the criteria for
exclusion. 450 Just as courts are reluctant to intrude on a prosecutor's discretion
in criminal law, courts hesitate to intrude on the President's policy choices
regarding admission and removal of noncitizens. 451 However, direct evidence
of animus alters the court's role in the criminal law and should have the same
effect in the immigration setting. In criminal law, courts can intervene in a
prosecutor's decision to bring charges against a defendant amid direct evidence
of prosecutorial animus. 4 52 Although courts do not currently recognize selective
immigration

enforcement

claims,

under Reno v. American-Arab Anti-

4 53 the

Supreme Court has reserved the possibility of
DiscriminationCommittee
recognizing a claim in "a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination
is so outrageous" to overcome the Court's general skepticism toward such
claims. 454 This appears to preserve space for a kind of "vindictive" immigration
enforcement claim. Ultimately, even an opinion evincing minimal concerns for

44 7

See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 876 (discussing Framers' concerns for preserving

religious conscience as well as "guard[ing] against the civic divisiveness that follows when
the government weighs in on one side of religious debate").
448 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (requiring only a "facially
legitimate and bona fide" reason for an exclusion decision).
449See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 492 U.S. 252, 270-71
n.21 (1977); Kagan, supra note 24, at 89.
450The prosecutor's discretion follows from the Executive's delegation to prosecutors
to enforce the Nation's laws, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996), and the
President's discretion itself follows from Congress's delegation under Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). Again, the more apt analogy would be
to the President's removal authority, but the critical features of vindictive prosecutionand animus--remain useful.
discretion
45
1See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (1979).
452 United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 2006).
453
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
454

See id.
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the rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings preserves the possibility of
judicial review of conscience-shocking animus. 4 55
This analogy is imperfect for several reasons. First, prosecutors, unlike the
President, are bound by ethical rules of conduct. 45 6 Second, prosecutors bring
charges against discrete defendants, while the President creates broad policy.
When it comes to immigration law and foreign affairs, the courts do not demand
precision in policymaking either. Ultimately, however, this analogy underscores
that executive action to advance an end other than the public welfare, under the
guise of executive discretion, warrants greater scrutiny. 4 57
Under the proposed mixed motives framework, inspired by courts'
treatment of vindictive prosecution claims, plaintiffs challenging an exclusion
EO must come forward, as they have in the travel ban litigation, with direct
evidence of the President's animus. 4 58 Once plaintiffs proffer this evidence, the
government should produce evidence indicating that animus was not a "but-for"
motive for the contested law.4 59 The government must produce evidence
showing that a legitimate purpose, such as national security, constitutes an
independently sufficient reason for the law6°0-not merely "an independent"
reason. 46 1 The plaintiff must ultimately prove that animus was essential. 46 2
455

Cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding police conduct
"shockfed] the conscience" where the police broke into a criminal defendant's home,
attempted to dislodge capsules from defendant's mouth, and then handcuffed him and
transported him to the hospital, where defendant's stomach was pumped against his will and
produced two morphine capsules).
4 56
See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT rr. 3.3, 3.6, 3.8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013)
(requiring, respectively, candor to the tribunal, limiting trial publicity, and requiring timely
disclosure of exculpatory evidence, among other obligations).
4 57
See ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 109-10.
4 58
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591-92, 594 (4th Cir.
2017), vacatingas moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
459
See United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2006); Verstein, supra note
36, at
1137-38.
460
See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1137-38.
461 Cf Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) ("But because there is persuasive
evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns,
quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept that independent justification.");
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the
denial of reconsideration en banc).
462 This motive standard finds support in statements by attorneys litigating the case as
well as scholarly commentary. For example, at oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs
conceded that the President's disavowal of his earlier anti-Muslim statements would render
the exclusion order constitutional. On that reasoning, the order becomes valid because
animus is no longer a necessary motive behind it. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6263, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965). In addition, Professor Michael C. Dorf
has argued that any "reasonable observer" would agree that the travel bans would not have
been promulgated "but for" the President's anti-Muslim animus. Michael Doff, SCOTUS
Travel Ban Argument Post-Mortem and the Surprising Relevance of Korematsu, DORF ON
LAW (Apr. 25, 2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/04/scotus-travel-ban-argument-postmortem.html [https://perma.cc/2B43-YMKL]; see also Marty Lederman, Contrary to
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As discussed above, the proposed framework is workable. But it also
expresses a compelling view of what plenary power means: a deference doctrine
that gives a certain freedom to the political branches to establish the criteria for
admission, but not a license to implement animus. It is the discretion to choose
among legitimate ends. When the President publicly chooses a mix of legitimate
and illegitimate ends, acting with mixed motives, he should be permitted to
enact policy for which the legitimate motives are sufficient; and he should be
prohibited from enacting policy for which the illegitimate motive is necessary.
Why? Official acts necessarily motivated by illegitimate motives are not
exercises of discretion; they are violations of it. And if an illegitimate motive is
ultimately unnecessary to the policy and a legitimate justification is sufficient
standing alone, that illegitimate motive cannot be said to have made a
difference. The proposed framework preserves the President's discretion to
4 63
advance legitimate ends.
This approach also seeks to create a process for developing an evidentiary
is
record from which the Court can evaluate the role of animus. The first step4 64
"particularity."
with
animus
pleading
complaint
a
file
for plaintiffs to
Plaintiffs would likely seek a preliminary injunction. Defendants would then
come forward with evidence of a sufficient legitimate purpose. To substantiate
that purpose, defendants might attach affidavits or declarations from national
security specialists, Cabinet officials, and even historians who can comment on
the consistency of the contested executive orders with prior orders in previous
Administrations. Ultimately, plaintiffs will have to undermine the independent
sufficiency of the government's stated reason. For example, in the travel ban
litigation, plaintiffs could demonstrate the "sham" nature of the waiver
process. 465 Challenges to exclusion orders are unlikely to be amenable to
resolution at the preliminary injunction phase. Through the creation of an
evidentiary record, however, the court acquires the tools needed to evaluate
whether the government's objectives are in fact "bona fide," to discern if the
stated justification is sufficient. Courts must consider the full factual record,

PopularBelief the Court Did Not Hold that the Travel Ban Is Lawful-Anything but, JUST

SEcuRITY (July 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58807/contrary-popular-belief-courthold-travel-ban-lawful-anything-but-which-ruling-justice-kennedys-deference-presidentsenforcement-ban-indefensible/ [https:/perma.cc/7QJ4-3356] (noting that "the Travel Ban
would not exist but for its foreseeable effect in excluding Muslims from entry"). Although
these commentators were not arguing for the "but-for" motive standard vis-A-vis the other
three main options, it is telling that it is a standard invoked so widely in the debate (except
courts).
in the
4 63
But see Brandon L. Garrett, UnconstitutionallyIllegitimate Discrimination,104 VA.

L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that an illegitimate motive alone is and should be
sufficient to render official action unconstitutional).
464 FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015).
465 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2445 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(describing plaintiffs' contention that the waiver process was "nothing more than a sham").
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including whether the existence of some facts undermine the likelihood of other
46 6
facts being true.
The framework proposed herein is designed for the exceptional present
times, but it aims to address an old question in immigration law that will likely
arise periodically. Critics note that the President has accused Mexico of sending
criminals into the United States, 46 7 called for a "shutdown" of Muslim
immigration, 4 68 expressed sympathy for Nazis, 4 69 and disparaged, in vulgar
language, black and brown countries from which many migrants hail. 470 His
"smoking gun" 4 7 1 animus should not escape judicial notice when such
comments communicate the legal purpose for his actions. 4 72 Taking notice,
however, does not require a radical reworking of immigration law. Instead,
when the President inserts racial or religious animus into public discourse of his
own accord, Mandel itself permits courts to demand that the government pay an

466For a discussion of a "mixed motives" presumption in the national security and
criminal law setting, see Lee Ross Crain, Note, The Legality of Deliberate Miranda
Violations: How Two-Step National Security Interrogations Undermine Miranda and
Destabilize Fifth Amendment Protections, 112 MIcH. L. REv. 453, 485-86 (2013). Crain
argues that a "mixed motives" presumption would mean that courts would not regard
evidence of a permissible motive, such as national security, as undermining the simultaneous
existence of an impermissible motive when law enforcement engage in two-step
interro gations, the first without the Mirandawarning, and then the second with it. Id
467Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump's False Comments Connecting Mexican
Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immig
rants-and-crime/?utmterm=.25ct9373bb83 [https://perma.cc/8VD3-9YAC].
468 Greg Sargent, Is This a 'Muslim Ban'? Look at the History-and at Trump's Own
Words, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2017/01/3 1/is-this-a-muslim-ban-look-at-the-history-and-at-trumps-ownwords/?utm term=.95333035a102 [https://perma.cc/7VC3-97VS] (arguing that Trump's
language does not definitively prove the ban is a "Muslim" ban, but his remarks leave room
to argue that the ban has an improper discriminatory intent and effect).
4 69
See Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on
Charlottesville; Again Blames 'Both Sides', N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conferencecharlottesville.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
470 Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers with DisparagingWordsfor
Haiti and Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/1 1/us/
politics/trump-shithole-countries.html [https://perma.cc/T8TZ-U6ME]. Unsurprisingly, the
President's animus has led to equal protection challenges to many of his Administration's
immigration law decisions, specifically the rescission of DACA and Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) for persons from Honduras and El Salvador. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of
Calif. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
471 United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2006).
4 72
See Shaw, supra note 435, at 139.
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"animus tax" in the form of fully litigating its motives. 4 73 in this manner, courts
474
may maintain two cherished values: deference and dignity.
B. Objections
One may anticipate several objections: (1) excluded noncitizens lack any
constitutional rights, thus straining the analogies to equal protection and
vindictive prosecution; (2) courts need to respect the political branches' national
security judgments regardless of animus; and (3) the proposed approach lacks
teeth and essentially results in a "sole motive" analysis used by a majority of
justices in Trump v. Hawaii.
First, critics are likely to assert that equal protection jurisprudence and the
vindictive prosecution analogy are strained or inapt because noncitizens outside
47 5 Challenges to a
of U.S. territory lack any rights of entry or equal protection.
facially neutral exclusion law enacted out of racial or religious animus would
invariably entail an assertion of equal protection rights, rights those excludable
476
noncitizens outside of the U.S. ostensibly lack. Two points are relevant. First,
in previous challenges to exclusion decisions, the weakness or complete lack of
constitutional rights of noncitizens outside the U.S. has not precluded judicial
review of exclusion decisions because citizens have brought suit to vindicate
their constitutional rights. 4 77 Second, the presence of "smoking gun" animus
changes the nature of the analysis, for even when constitutional interests are
"minimal," the Supreme Court has recognized the potentially unique
4 78 If severe animus
circumstances presented by "outrageous discrimination."
4 79 constitutional interests more
can make removable noncitizens' "minimal"
robust, then it could also enhance the importance of constitutional interests
implicated, however indirectly, by exclusion laws as well. Essentially, when
direct evidence of animus is at hand, the Court might consider equal protection
more of a structural constraint on the government, much like the religion
clauses, 480 rather than an individual right that noncitizens can assert.
4 73

See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 770 (1972).
4 74

See AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: TiE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 205-08 (2015) (discussing evidence of human dignity as a

value in the U.S. Constitution).
constitutional
4 75
See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 666 (4th Cir. 2017)
dissenting), vacating as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
J.,
(Agee,
4 76
See NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 7-8 (describing the territorial conception of

rights).
constitutional
4 77
4 78

See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 764.
See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,491 (1999).

479_[d.
4 80

Cf H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational:The Roberts Court and the
Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 246 (2011) (describing an equal
protection case as premised on the view that the government must pursue a "legitimate public
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Next, critics might contend that national security interests require accepting
policy based on stereotypes or ordinarily suspect classifications. The political
branches have often relied on this flexibility to respond to international events
or implement policies perceived to enhance safety.4 8 1 Although the political
branches have substantial discretion to balance factors, privilege some values
over others, and design policy, the rare case of policy accompanied by "smoking
gun" animus differs from the usual scenario because it implicates the structural
considerations noted above. Scholars have further disputed the concept of
"national security exceptionalism, '4 82 and courts have warned against giving
national security "talismanic" power. 483 Permitting any government policy to
be implemented simply because government officials invoke national security
would create a reservoir of absolute power that would undermine our legal
4 84
system's design.
Finally, from the other side of the debate, critics might argue that the
proposed framework lacks teeth, offering scrutiny insufficient to vindicate the
important rights and interests at stake. On this view, the government would
nearly always be able to show that it would have made the same decision
regardless of animus simply by proffering expert views of the President's
national security team. 48 5 The President might quite easily be able to satisfy the
evidentiary requirement. Where the President can articulate a legitimate reason,
will courts meaningfully quantify the relative contribution of that reason and the
proffered animus? Or will they, in effect, use the "sole motive" standard
purpose" when intruding on liberty and making statutory classifications); Vladeck, supra
note4 75.
81
See supra Part II.
4 82
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, National Security Exceptionalism and the
Travel Ban Litigation, LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/nationalsecurity-exceptionalism-and-travel-ban-litigation [https://perma.cc/EBF4-GCER] (rejecting
view that "all national security cases as a group should be subject to different analysis than
cases not related to national security" as unable to "withstand logical scrutiny").
483 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 774 (9th Cir. 2017) ("National security is not a
'talismanic incantation' that, once invoked, can support any and all exercise of executive
power under [INA § 212(f)]."), vacating as moot, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.); see also
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128

HARV. L. REv. 1897, 1948 (2015) ("In sum, foreign relations law may not actually be so

different from ordinary domestic law."). But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418
(2018) (discussing "admission and exclusion of foreign nations" as a political judgment
"largely
immune" from judicial review).
4 84

See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,217-18 (1953) (Black,
J., dissenting); Cox, supra note 18, at 423.
485 Sufficient evidence might consist of declarations from national security experts or
other officials regarding the identification systems in countries around the world, or experts
who could speak to the relative threat posed by the banned countries. Ironically, plaintiffs in
the travel ban litigation marshaled this sort of evidence to undermine the ban's purported

national security benefits, thus supporting the view that the bans were based on invidious

discrimination. See Joint Declaration of Madeleine K. Albright et al. at 4-5, Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105).
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suggested by dissenting judges in the travel ban litigation? 486 Admittedly, this
mixed motives framework is deferential, but it nonetheless requires the
President to prove that he has an independently sufficient legitimate reason for
pursuing the same policy. 4 87 This requirement of independent sufficiency means
that courts will have to seriously scrutinize the evidence and conclude that
legitimate reasons fully support the policy, and that the President's animus,
488
while ugly, was essentially "harmless error."

The proposed approach further has expressive value. 489 It condemns
irrational hostility toward a class of people defined by a characteristic that the
courts would regard as "protected" were these people within U.S. territory.
Further, it signals to citizens and noncitizens here and abroad that even the
President cannot both openly use animus as a currency with his base and
simultaneously hide it from the courts. 4 90 It forces the government to stop, slow
down, and pay an "animus tax" in the form of explaining itself, demonstrating
the legitimacy of its enactment. Even if animus-laced policies remain in place,
forces the Executive to take
the process of proving and sorting motives
49 1
motives.
of
set
full
its
for
responsibility
VI. CONCLUSION

As Justice Frankfurter observed inhis concurring opinion in Harisiades,
plenary power in immigration has historically permitted laws both "crude and
cruel," and at the time he wrote, laws embodying racial or religious animus as
well.4 92 Since that time, constitutional and immigration law have evolved, and
the plenary power doctrine has receded in many domains. 49 3 Under 8 U.S.C.
4 86

See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J.,

dissenting).
4 87
See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1137 n.112. In contrast, the Supreme Court made no
inquiry into the existence of an independently sufficient justification. See Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S.Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) ("[W]e must accept [the President's] independent
justification.").
4 88
See Dorf, supranote 462 (arguing that animus was the but-for cause of the bans, and
that some serious level of scrutiny would ordinarily be required under such circumstances);
Kagan, supra note 24, at 89 (noting that the "mere ability to investigate [the President's
motives] would be a significant victory [for plaintiffs]").
4 89
Cf Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REv. 655, 696 (2012)
anti-discrimination law's expressive value).
(notint
49
0 See Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 257 (4th Cir. 2018)
("[W]e conclude that the Proclamation is unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward
Islam."), vacated by 2018 WL 1256938 (2018).
491 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 89-90. But cf Levy, supra note 38. Levy argues that
the question of how to constrain the President is transsubstantive, implicating not only the
President's exclusion power, but his pardon power, his power to fire the special counsel, and
other areas where the President enjoys near-absolute power. In such a situation, we risk
casting2 the courts as saviors, but as Levy argues, real constraints will require politics. id.
4 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4 93
Motomura, supra note 47, at 610-11.
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§ 1182(f), the President possesses a power that lacks clear boundaries. 494 The
search for limits, however, should encompass the full set of limits - separation
of powers, Congress's promulgation of an intricate statutory scheme, as well as
4 95
improper motive.
Where animus influences a law that would ordinarily be entitled to
deference, courts have generally responded in one of two ways. First, judges
have argued for continuing to defer to the President and for ignoring his extrinsic
statements, or considering them but nonetheless allowing the government to
respond with a legitimate reason for the law, however pretextual or
insubstantial. 4 96 Second, courts have deemed the animus to be a form of bad
faith, allowing them to apply heightened scrutiny, and requiring the government
to supply a compelling justification for acting as it did and demonstrate that it
has used the least restrictive means for achieving it. 49 7 This Article, however,
argues that there is a third way: a mixed motives framework using a "but-for"
motive standard. This framework strives to preserve deference to the political
branches' judgments without mistaking animus for expertise.
Critics observe that President Trump's travel bans sowed chaos at home and
abroad. Given that his Executive Orders did what he, for months, had said he
would do, this result may surprise some. On the other hand, perhaps Americans
and noncitizens planning to visit for work or family reasons could not believe
that the President, a person who took the oath of office, and not merely a
candidate engaged in electioneering, would bar noncitizens without the
traditional reasons for invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). The President's exceptional
use of the political branches' plenary power to exclude noncitizens further
inverted norms 498 with his public remarks denigrating Muslims, and the courts
have since faced a difficult challenge in drawing a line between deference and
abdication. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Trump v. Hawaiicalls for reform.
With sensitive, important interests at stake, a more nuanced approach to
deference and animus is needed as the lower courts consider challenges to the
travel ban on remand, and for the future. This Article aspires to offer precisely
such an approach.

4 94

See MANUEL, supra note 44, at 1. ("Neither the text of Section 212(f) nor the case

law to date suggests any firm legal limits upon the President's exercise of his authority to
exclude aliens under this provision.").
495 See, e.g., Brief of Amici CuriaeImmigration Law Scholars on the Text and Structure
of the Immigration and Nationality Act in Support of Respondents at 4, Trump v. Hawaii
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
49 6
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J.,

dissenting).
497 Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591-93 (4th Cir. 2017),
vacating
as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).
49 8
See Levy, supra note 436 (discussing President Trump's "norm inversion").

